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ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Ryan Holifield

In this dissertation research, I investigate three interrelated conflicts which emerged as
part of an environmental impact assessment along the Savannah River in the late 1990s: a
controversial plan to improve water quality through supplemental oxygen injection; a
lengthy struggle over federal funding policies that constrained efforts to address scientific
uncertainty; and an entrenched refusal to investigate human health risks from air toxics at
the Port of Savannah. In each of these conflicts, I trace the dismantling of controversy,
investigating how, and with what effect, the slow and tedious work of building consensus
has reshaped the governance of the lower Savannah River. Drawing on extensive
archival and ethnographic work in Savannah, Georgia, I find that different constitutions,
manipulations, and deployments of space—in the form of habitat suitability maps or
containerized cargo forecast projections—enabled long-standing and intensified
controversies to be channeled into consensus. In doing so, I argue that environmental
impact assessment in Savannah is aimed at constituting the city and the river as sites of
both modern industrial port operations and sleepy, moss-covered, bucolic Southern
landscapes, in a tension-filled effort to remain articulated with both the tremendous flows
of financial capital from global shipping and historic tourism that converge on the city.
First, my analysis of efforts to improve water quality through supplemental oxygen
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highlights the intricate spatial arrangements necessary to make these efforts work. Next,
my study of adaptive management politics reveals the ways in which memory and its
material traces erode institutional risk-aversion, opening new opportunities for better
resource management and increased ecological resilience. Lastly, my investigation of air
toxics at the Port of Savannah reveals how different constructions of space are combined,
intersected, and overlapped in ways that erase human health risks and construct
compliance with federal environmental justice policy. Taken together, these conflicts
suggest that space serves as a strategic resource in environmental impact assessments,
contributing to how problems get defined and solutions get proposed. Further, this
research underlines the need for greater attention to the active role of spatial constructs—
boundaries, networks, scales, or pathways—in environmental impact assessment practice
and policy.
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“The question appears to be simply this, whether Savannah Harbor is of sufficient
importance to warrant the outlay of a large sum of money…”
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- Chapter 1 Introduction
This dissertation analyzes three interrelated controversies that emerged along the
Savannah River in the late 1990s. Plans to deepen the river and improve navigation at
the Port of Savannah had been met with virulent criticism in the wake of the plan’s
projected environmental impacts, including widespread losses of freshwater wetlands in
the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge from saltwater intrusion, losses of critical
fisheries habitat for striped bass and the endangered shortnose sturgeon from increased
salinity and reduced dissolved oxygen, increased contamination of municipal drinking
water for city residents from saltwater intrusion, and increased sediment erosion along
the beaches of Tybee Island. The project was tremendously controversial from the outset;
the Georgia Ports Authority had fast-tracked the project’s initial environmental impact
studies, and opponents argued that the rush had led to severely flawed assessments that
substantially underestimated the costs for long-term environmental mitigation and erased
significant risks to human health (Citizens for Environmental Justice 2011; Hricko 2011).
The refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and located just upriver from
the port, had lost several hundred acres of rare tidal freshwater wetlands from saltwater
intrusion and witnessed a spectacular collapse of the river’s striped bass fishery following
years of deepening, widening, and engineering projects by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to improve the navigation channel. In South Carolina the deepening was
viewed as a catastrophic blow to the economic future of the Port of Charleston, and the
death knell for plans to build a bi-state port located in Jasper County. “I call it the rape of
the river,” said Glenn McConnell, then state senator from Charleston’s 41st District.
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“That’s what it is. This is as bad as when the Indians sold Manhattan for $27 in trinkets,
but at least they got trinkets. All we get is toxic sludge” (Slade 2012).
In many ways, the conflict in Savannah is one that has played out numerous
times: contested histories, shared political territory, overlapping institutional
jurisdictions, and competing economic agenda that result in incendiary accusations,
political fallout, and bureaucratic dysfunction. But in other respects the conflict in
Savannah has been distinct—unique, even. Indeed, perhaps the most fascinating part of
the story in Savannah has been how the project—so intensely controversial at its outset—
became, for all intents and purposes, so agreeable. By 2013, the project had been
deemed one of the seven “nationally and regionally significant infrastructure projects”
fast-tracked as part of the Obama administration’s “We Can’t Wait” initiative (Mayle
2014, n.p.). State and federal resource agencies had dropped their objections, legal
challenges in South Carolina were settled, and Vice President Joe Biden visited the docks
at the Port of Savannah, promising the harbor deepening would get done “come hell or
high water” (Mayle 2013, n.p.).
In the chapters that follow, my overarching goal has been to explore how the
tremendous controversy that initially characterized the deepening project has been slowly
dismantled and delegitimized, only to be replaced by consensus and agreement. Drawing
from three interrelated conflicts—over water quality, adaptive management, and human
health risk—I argue that environmental impact assessment is, at its most basic, a
technomanagerial practice of place-making, one aimed at constituting Savannah as a site
of both modern industrial port operations and sleepy, moss-covered, bucolic Southern
landscapes, in a tension-filled effort to remain articulated with both the tremendous flows
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of financial capital from global shipping and historic tourism that converge on the city.
In the next section, I offer a brief background on the Georgia Ports Authority’s
“Savannah Harbor Expansion Project.” Next, I sketch out the structure of the
dissertation, outlining the three case-study controversies and their corresponding research
questions, and the primary data sources and methods of analysis used to investigate each.
Orientations: the Georgia Ports Authority’s “Savannah Harbor Expansion Project”
The Port of Savannah sits roughly 30 miles from the coast up the Savannah River,
the border shared by Georgia and South Carolina. At 1,200 acres, the port’s Garden City
Terminal is North America’s largest single-terminal container facility; Savannah is the
fastest growing port in the nation, and the 2nd busiest container exporter in the U.S
(Georgia Ports Authority 2013). In 2014, the Port of Savannah moved more than 3
million TEUs, or twenty foot equivalent units (Georgia Ports Authority 2015).
Nonetheless, all other things being equal, the Savannah River is a terrible place
for a deep-water port. The Savannah carries substantial amounts of silt, and like other
lowland coastal rivers, its “natural” condition contains a number of islands dividing the
river into a series of slow-moving, shallow, and meandering channels in its lower reaches
- a condition that tends to markedly complicate maintaining commercial navigation. As a
result, the river has been subject to a near constant series of deepening, widening, and
engineering projects aimed at improving the navigation channel, the most recent of which
is designed to accommodate the growing number of increasingly super-sized vessels
calling at the port.
Over the last several decades container vessels have exploded in size, many of
which are now too large to pass through the locks of the Panama Canal. New classes of
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“post-Panamax” or “New Panamax” vessels are simply too large to fit through the locks,
and although they currently make up only a small portion of the world’s fleet, they
account for nearly half of its cargo capacity (Hricko 2008). In an effort to keep pace with
trends in global shipping, Panama has been building a third set of locks to accommodate
these larger vessels. And although most ports along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts will be
unable to handle the new vessels, the Panama Canal Expansion has nonetheless set off a
fierce competition between port authorities for federal cost sharing dollars to dredge
deeper harbors, raise bridges, and improve rail lines and highways to accommodate larger
ships and higher cargo volumes (Hricko 2008).
The project in Savannah is designed to dredge more than 30 miles of the river’s
navigation channel to a mean-low-water level of 47 feet. Combined with Savannah’s
nearly 8 foot daily tidal range, the port’s Garden City Terminal would be able to regularly
serve vessels with drafts greater than 50 feet, and with its superior proximity to Interstate
95, would be well positioned to handle expanding cargo volumes. The Georgia Ports
Authority submitted a Feasibility Study Report and Tier I Environmental Impact
Statement to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Congress for adoption and approval
in the summer of 1998. Congress gave the project conditional authorization the next year
but, in the face of significant opposition from state and federal resource agencies, it
included two additional provisions before construction could begin (WRDA 1999). First,
the Corps of Engineers, in consultation with affected federal, state, and local entities, was
required to prepare a new, comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The
document is a requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
describes the full range of environmental consequences, feasible project alternatives,
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expected economic development benefits, and the mitigation plans for any proposed
federal actions significantly affecting the environment.
Second, the provisions required that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Marine Fisheries Service approve the
selected plan for navigation and its associated mitigation plans (WRDA 1999). The
Savannah River is subject to a complex jurisdictional governance structure: the National
Marine Fisheries Service is charged with the role of protecting the short-nose sturgeon,
an endangered species found primarily in east coast rivers and estuaries, under threat
from the loss of suitable habitat from the conversion of freshwater wetlands and the
drastic reductions in the amounts of dissolved oxygen necessary to support bottomdwelling fish species. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is charged with protecting the
Savannah National Wildlife Refuge – particularly the preservation of tidal freshwater
marsh. Lastly, the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for setting and
maintaining water quality standards in the river. Following nearly fifteen years of
additional studies and assessments, the project completed its NEPA compliance
requirements on October 26, 2012 following a favorable Record of Decision by the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
Navigating: questions, approach, and contributions
The dissertation is structured around three inter-related, yet distinct, controversies
that have unfolded within the larger political conflict over the Savannah Harbor
Expansion Project, and which are presented in chapters two, three, and four as standalone papers. Although these papers are presented as a sequence, the negotiations that I
discuss did not unfold as such, and should not be read as a progression from one conflict
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to the next. Indeed, one of the most complex characteristics of the Savannah Harbor
Expansion Project was that the debates and conflicts presented here—as well as many
others—occurred simultaneously. In the final chapter of the dissertation I summarize its
major findings and contributions, closing with a discussion of its limitations and the
possibilities for future geographic scholarship that these suggest.
Controversies and research questions
In Chapter two, I begin by investigating the “improvement” of the Savannah
River’s dissolved oxygen regime. Initial water quality modeling indicated that the
deepening would exacerbate the harbor’s already degraded dissolved oxygen levels,
threatening vital fisheries habitat and causing significant concern among waterfront
industries that feared the potential effect of the deepening on the future of their point
source discharge permits. In response, the Ports Authority and the Corps of Engineers
proposed a system to artificially oxygenate the river, “offsetting” the potential water
quality impacts from the deepening and “restoring” its ability to both support vital
fisheries habitat and metabolize point source discharges. Despite having never been
applied at such a grand scale or to such a complex estuarine system, the approach—the
injection of superoxygenated river water via Speece Cones—became the central, and
most controversial, feature of the Corps’ mitigation plan. In this chapter, I trace the
history of the water quality modeling and mitigation effort, asking: How, and with what
consequences, has oxygen injection intersected with and transformed modes of water
quality regulation in the harbor?
In Chapter three, I turn my attention to stakeholders’ lingering concerns over
scientific uncertainty. While several of the Corps mitigation measures were being
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proposed for the first time, others were saddled with a relatively dismal record of success.
A series of unintended impacts from previous harbor deepening and engineering projects
had left the lower Savannah River a landscape full of already failed mitigation strategies:
a deteriorating system of freshwater controls in the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge, a
collapsed striped bass fishery, and devastating losses of freshwater wetlands. In
response, stakeholders adopted a memo outlining a comprehensive process of adaptive
management, recognizing that no predictions made by the Corps would be entirely
accurate or mitigation strategies entirely effective. And while newly passed federal
legislation required that the Corps include and implement adaptive management as part of
its mitigation projects, neither Congress nor Corps Headquarters had issued any guidance
on what adaptive management actually entailed. Consequently, the question of how to
fund it, how to coordinate it, what triggered an intervention and by whom, became points
of intense controversy. In this chapter, I trace the development of the project’s postconstruction monitoring and adaptive management plans, asking: How have the
institutional resistance and inertia that undermine adaptive management implementation
been overcome in Savannah?
In Chapter four, I shift my focus to investigate claims of environmental injustice
in the port’s surrounding neighborhoods. Despite projected growths in container traffic,
the Corps predicted an overall reduction in the port’s future air emissions, ultimately
concluding that the project posed no potential risks to human health. The assessment
drew sharp criticism from both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
local environmental justice advocates, who maintained that the assessments
systematically misrepresented the port’s air emissions, particularly its landside truck and
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rail operations. The neighborhoods of Hudson Hill, Woodville, and West Savannah—
which compose Savannah’s predominantly African American west side, and have
received numerous EPA grants and awards for environmental justice advocacy—are
crisscrossed by highways and rail lines that service the port, and air toxics from the
operation of the Garden City Terminal’s truck and rail corridors have long been a major
concern among residents. Despite strident objections from local environmental justice
advocates, the Savannah District refused to conduct either a detailed dispersion modeling
assessment of air toxics or a screening level risk-based assessment of the health effects
associated with the deepening, maintaining that project posed no risks to human health, a
claim to which the EPA, ultimately, conceded. In this chapter, I trace the history of the
project’s air quality and emission inventory, asking: How has the Savannah District
demonstrated that the deepening project poses no risk to public health and complies with
federal environmental justice policy?
Primary data sources and methods of analysis
To answer these questions, I rely on archival and ethnographic methods, drawing
heavily from two sets of digital records: first, the project’s Final Environmental Impact
Statement and General Re-Evaluation Report released in 2012 and maintained online at
the homepage of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District1; and second, the
documentary record compiled for the project’s Stakeholders Evaluation Group and
maintained online at the Georgia Ports Authority’s Savannah Harbor Expansion Project

1

http://www.sas.usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks/SavannahHarborExpansion.aspx (last accessed 4
February 2015)
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Information Site2. These digital records include an extensive archive of supplemental
engineering studies, technical assessments, inter-agency review comments,
correspondence between state and federal cooperating agencies and their consultants,
meeting summaries, inter-agency memoranda, as well as agenda, transcripts, meeting
notes, and correspondence, technical advisory and committee reports, public comments,
decision documents, news releases, presentations from public meetings, work plans,
Corps of Engineers policy guidance, public notices, supplemental studies, and meeting
summaries produced in the nearly fifteen year development and negotiation of the
project’s Final Environmental Impact Statement. This extensive archive provides some
of the richest opportunities to follow the negotiations of agency scientists, public
officials, industry representatives, non-profit organizations, and concerned citizens in the
development of the project’s impact assessments and mitigation strategies. Each chapter
draws on these extensive resources selectively, and I provide a more detailed discussion
of the specific primary sources used in each within.
In many respects, the archive of the Stakeholders Evaluation Group proved to be
more helpful than either the Final Environmental Impact Statement or General ReEvaluation Reports. While each of these documents are an exhaustive record in and of
themselves—each containing an extensive record of the more or less “official”
interagency coordination between the federal and state cooperating agencies (e.g., letters,
comments and responses on technical assessments, Memoranda for Record)—in almost
every case, and certainly in the case of the three controversies I analyze further below,
the most heated exchanges and frank discussion occurred at length in earlier meetings of

2

http://sav-harbor.com/ (last accessed 4 August 2014)
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the Stakeholders Evaluation Group or one of its working committees.3 While the site was
maintained by the Ports Authority, the content was largely unregulated, and was designed
to facilitate information exchange between Group members by allowing any and all
parties to submit documents (e.g., meeting notes, correspondence, news articles,
committee summary reports, draft reports) to the archive with the understanding that it
did not represent official positions, decisions, or consensus of the membership.
Nonetheless, the digital record compiled and maintained by the Stakeholders
Evaluation Group suffered from inherent limitations. First, while only part of the
documentary record made available to the Group was ultimately included in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement and General Re-Evaluation Report, their membership,
and by proxy my research, did not have access to documents considered classified,
privileged, or confidential. This constitutes perhaps the most important—yet
insurmountable—limitation to my archival analysis. Second, there is the problematic
notion of the Group’s membership. The Group was initially formed to serve as an
advisory body to the Ports Authority; raising a number of questions about how it would
be incorporated into the formal coordination process of the federal and state agencies.
For instance, how would it measure “consensus” decisions, and could they be
authoritative in light of each agency’s jurisdictional responsibility? These questions
became even more critical in 2001, following a Memorandum of Understanding between
the Corps and the Ports Authority, officially making the Corps the lead agency on the
project and, from the perspective of several stakeholders, substantially reducing the

3

SEG working committees included: Aquifer Committee, Beach Erosion Committee, Communications
Committee, Dredging Committee, Economics Working Group, Fisheries/Aquatic Resources Committee,
Modeling Technical Review Group, Operating Guidelines, and Striped Bass Committee.
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Group’s influence. Not all members of the Group were considered equally, and on
several occasions documents, or parts of documents, were shared selectively between
resource agencies and other members. While the Group was initially imagined to include
representatives from the relatively small group of state and federal cooperating
agencies—principally, the Corps, the Ports Authority (the project’s local sponsor),
NOAA Fisheries, EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service, the Georgia Department of Natural
Resources, and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control—it
ultimately became a much more diverse, albeit relatively privileged, exclusive, and still
problematic, body including representatives from local branches of major environmental
organizations (e.g., Sierra Club, League of Conservation Voters, Georgia Conservancy)
and interest groups (e.g., the Savannah Manufacturers Council, City of Tybee Island).
But there is another reason for my use of the Group’s archives: although certainly
an incomplete and partial record of the negotiations over the Savannah Harbor Expansion
Project, it does consist of the documents made openly available to project stakeholders
involved in the most extensive public involvement campaign in the history of the
Savannah District—and the first time a stakeholder group has been included in a deepdraft navigation project. It can therefore be seen as representative of the level (in terms
of “publicity” or “accessibility”) at which participation and collaborative governance
have been organized in the project’s impact assessment and mitigation planning. Using
this archive, then, is to have available as close to the same set of resources as the
stakeholders themselves had as they negotiated the project’s rationale, impacts, and
mitigation.
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At least initially, my intention was to schedule formal interviews with
representatives of the Stakeholders Evaluation Group and the project’s cooperating
agencies. But in March of 2011, the Southern Environmental Law Center challenged the
project in South Carolina court on behalf of the Savannah Riverkeeper, South Carolina
Coastal Conservation League, South Carolina Wildlife Federation, and Conservation
Voters of South Carolina. In April of 2012, the Ports Authority was advised by its
attorneys to no longer host Stakeholders meetings. The organizations of several Group
participants had either filed or were representing multiple challenges in court, and had
listed other Group participants as witnesses, and it was not until May of 2013 that a
settlement agreement was reached. While the legal challenges to the deepening project
were ultimately settled, they proved to be a significant challenge to securing “official”
interviews with Stakeholders participants and the agencies involved in the project’s
planning. The Ports Authority and the Savannah District, for example, refused multiple
requests for interviews, citing the legal challenges and referring me to the websites and
documents for information about the project, its benefits, impacts, and proposed
mitigation plans.
Some agencies and organizations involved, however, were willing to speak with
me about the project under the explicit provision that the discussion was “off the record.”
Most commonly, these “interviews” took the form of informal conversations—over
coffee and a walk through Forsyth Park, for example—providing invaluable insights used
less to “triangulate” my research findings than to enrich my readings of the documents.
Additionally, the people with whom I spoke frequently referred to me to key documents
included in the record—as well as to relevant press releases, interviews, and other news

13

accounts not included in the record but delivered by a representative in some “official”
capacity—citing gaps in their own knowledge or a desire not to “misrepresent” what
“actually” happened. Although the Stakeholders Evaluation Group’s meetings had
officially ended, I was able to regularly attend monthly meetings of the Savannah
Metropolitan Planning Commission and the City of Tybee Island’s “Beach Task Force.”
Although not directly related to the deepening project, Planning Commission meetings
were focused on the development of city’s new “Unified Zoning Ordinance” and
“Tricentennial Plan,” which involved remaking much of west Savannah in order to better
accommodate port operations, while Beach Task Force meetings focused on shoreline
protection and beach nourishment, projects within which the Corps was centrally
involved. These meetings—and the informal conversations that developed afterwards—
proved immensely helpful for informing my documentary analysis.
Although the majority of my analysis consisted of the project’s documentary
record supplemented by semi- and unstructured interviews with project stakeholders, I
also rely on twelve months of ethnographic work in Savannah, conducted from August
2012 to August 2013. In the summer of 2012, I moved into the home of my 89-year old
maternal grandmother, Katherine Floyd, and it was everyday life among family and
friends in Savannah that ultimately provided much of the most important data for, and
insights into, my analysis. Situated near the Vernon River just a few miles south of the
city, it is the place where I have spent nearly every summer since my early childhood fishing, crabbing, and swimming in the tidal creeks that carve up the landscape into
countless islands and hammocks. Over the years, I’ve spent hours wandering the city’s
Historic District or the wildlife refuge, first with my grandfather, and then later with my
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own father, listening to stories about the city’s history. A significant portion of my
extended family lives in the city: my uncle and aunt, Steve and Laura Floyd, and their
three children, Conor, Sarah, and Sam, live right next door. In many ways, it was my
position as a “grandson” and “nephew” that opened some of the most productive,
although informal, avenues for my research: conversations that developed after church
services on Sundays or in the bleachers during high school baseball games on weekday
evenings. Truthfully, I think that I was something of a curiosity for many people.
Strangely, I often found myself being approached by friends-of-friends of someone in the
family curious to hear about why I had come to Savannah, and quite frequently found
myself awash in homeowners, parents, business owners, and past and current port
workers – longshoremen, line-handlers, tug operators, and harbor pilots – all ready and
willing to share their thoughts and opinions about the city, its problems, and possibilities.
Still, the overwhelming majority of persons with whom I encountered regularly
could arguably be described as Savannah’s “old guard” – white, suburban, upper-middle
class, life-long residents troubled by many of the city’s more recent trends. I arrived in
Savannah during a particularly interesting historical “moment”: the departure of city
manager, Rochelle Small-Toney. The council nominated Small-Toney after a bitter,
months-long fight that led to what some described as Savannah's worst race relations
since the 1960's (Montoya 2011). After less than two years on the job, Small-Toney was
asked to resign. She was Savannah’s first African-American city manager, and following
a reprimand by city officials over questionable hiring practices and a $6 million backlog
in the city’s Purchasing Department, accusations flew. Those calling for her resignation
were accused of outright racism. Small-Toney’s supporters were accused of favoritism,
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and former Mayor Otis Johnson’s express desire to hire someone “that looks like me to
be the city manager” led to accusations that Small-Toney had not been the most qualified
candidate (Montoya 2011, n.p.).
During this same time period, the city was enduring a lengthy battle of another
kind: the question of whether to allow double-decker tour buses in its Historic District.
For nearly the last two decades, Savannah has had a blanket ban on double-decker buses
– opposed by downtown residents who claim the buses invade their privacy and allow
tourists to peer over garden walls and look into upstairs bedroom windows. A Bostonbased tourism operator had submitted a proposal to bring several of the double-decker
buses to Savannah, and was asking the city council to lift the blanket ban. The proposal
generated significant opposition from city residents – from both within and outside of the
Historic District. While Historic District residents expressed immediate concerns over
privacy violations, wider debates and conversations focused on the city’s exploding
tourism industry – estimated at nearly $2 billion as of 2011 (Associated Press 2011).
Nearly 12 million tourists visit Savannah each year, and tensions over traffic and parking
in the Historic District have greatly intensified in the last several decades (Conn 2013,
n.p.).
My point here is this: I arrived in Savannah at a time when the desire for
agreement was somewhat palpable. Long, drawn-out controversies on numerous fronts
had taken a significant toll on residents and public officials alike, and there appeared to
be a very deliberate effort to emphasize recent points of political agreement and the
benefits of consensus decision-making. Undoubtedly, these related conflicts and
disagreements—and the desire for resolution and agreement that they seemed to
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encourage—affected my conversations in Savannah. There certainly exists the
possibility that the desire to maintain the consensus that ultimately developed in
Savannah resulted in a selective remembering or forgetting of the tensions and
negotiations that animated the wider controversy over the deepening project, unwittingly
romanticizing the project as more or less controversial than it actually was.
Despite their inherent limitations, the final Environmental Impact Statement and
General Re-Evaluation Report, the documentary record compiled and maintained by the
Stakeholders Evaluation Group, and my ethnographic work constitute an extremely rich
body of material for analysis. In each of the following chapters, my methodological
approach draws broad inspiration from actor-network theory (Latour 1999, 2004, 2005)
and related approaches at the intersection of political ecology and science studies
(Bennett 2005; Braun and Whatmore 2010; Hennessy 2013; Heynen et al. 2007; Robbins
2007). Drawing from this framework, the central unit of analysis is a controversy, a
conflict over what Latour (2004, 2005) terms a matter of concern. These are situations in
which the facts are not yet fully established; where disputes over facts previously
identified as “technical” – what he calls a matter of fact – become increasingly tangled
with issues conventionally described as “political.” For Latour, the distinctive
contribution of the actor-network approach is the ability to “trace a network,” producing a
descriptive account of events and following the series of connections that make things
happen as they “transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements
they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2005, p.39).
Thus, the analyses presented in each of the following chapters are not about
evaluating whether any particular mitigation strategy “worked” nor are they about
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uncovering some “truth” about what “actually” happened. Rather, my primary interests
are the particular and contingent spatial orderings that the documents imply, and the
political implications that follow from them. How, for instance, was a diverse (and, in
some cases, seemingly unrelated) set of human and non-human elements—hydrodynamic
models, ultra-low-sulfur diesel fuel, and the National Director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service—assembled, combined, and arranged in ways that produced profound
effects—more flexible water quality standards, compliance with federal environmental
justice policy, and more comprehensive post-construction monitoring—to the point that
controversy and disagreement no longer made sense? And how have these new
combinations of people and things remade the landscape of capitalism, the state, and the
lower Savannah River estuary, and with what effects? My interests, then, are not in what
the documents are “really” saying, or whether they are actually “true.” Rather, I am
concerned with the consequences of their combination: how—and with what—they
constitute problems, define solutions, and arrange possible futures.
In each chapter, I began with at the end of a controversy: oxygen injection had
been agreed upon as a feasible mitigation strategy; the project’s monitoring and adaptive
management plan had been successfully expanded; and claims of human health risks and
environmental injustice had been successfully eliminated. To understand how these
controversies were resolved – or, in Latour’s terms, moved from matters of concern to
matters of fact – I began with Appendix A of the project’s Final Environmental Impact
Statement. This appendix included all of the Corps of Engineers’ responses to comments
received from the review of its 2010 Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Draft
General Re-Evaluation Report during their 60-day public comment period (as required
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by the National Environmental Policy Act). Using these responses, I was able to
systematically trace the resolution to each of my case study conflicts: identifying the key
documents, people, or ideas that supported each one of the Corps of Engineers’
arguments and claims. The structure and layout of the public comments and the Corps’
responses to them were surprisingly helpful; the reviewers – whether a federal or state
resource agency, advocacy organization, business group, or concerned citizen – tended to
lay out their claims, critiques, and concerns point-by-point, taking great pains to identify
each one as clearly as possible using bullet-points, numbered lists, or section headings
and sub-headings. The Corps responded in kind, addressing each one of the critiques or
concerns individually, identifying each of the essential technical reports, policy
initiatives, or decision documents that supported their claims. Using these responses, I
was able to identify the key actants – anything, human or nonhuman, to which agency
was attributed – and trace the sequence of events and connections that worked to support
oxygen injection as a feasible mitigation strategy, to expand the project’s monitoring and
adaptive management plan, and to eliminate claims of human health risks and
environmental injustice. In the chapters that follow, my aim is to describe the process of
impact assessment and mitigation planning as it unfolded in Savannah, from a
perspective that is both incomplete, and one that is in favor of some arrangements of
human and non-humans (and some urban-ecological futures) over others.
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- Chapter 2 Adding acres: oxygen injection, acceptable fish habitat, and the remaking of water
governance in the Savannah Harbor

Abstract. When water quality modeling indicated that plans to further deepen the
Savannah River would threaten the future of point source polluters in the harbor,
the Georgia Ports Authority quickly introduced a plan to offset the impacts of the
deepening and secure the future of dischargers. The plan replaced draconian
reductions in point-source discharges with a new hydro-technical logic, centered
on the construction of a massive oxygen injection system in the harbor as a means
to manage its increasingly contradictory set of dissolved oxygen demands. In this
chapter, I explore a delicate and tenuous assembling of hydrodynamic models,
suitable fish criteria, and water quality targets that produced oxygen injection as a
“hydro-social fix” (Swyngedouw 2013) for the Savannah Harbor. I show how
these efforts enabled scientists, engineers, and regulators to more effectively
manage the river’s dissolved oxygen demands in space and time, focusing oxygen
injection to the sites where it could most effectively support and protect vital
fisheries habitat and thereby eliminate the need for point source discharge
reductions. In doing so, I argue that oxygen injection and the assemblages of
improvement that make it work have facilitated increasingly flexible water quality
standards and regulation in the Georgia and South Carolina lowcountry, and
encouraged the river’s transition to a devolved, market-led water governance
framework. The case extends work on the political ecology of water by
highlighting the intricate spatial arrangements necessary to resolve the
contradictions of capital accumulation associated with water quality crises and
make “hydro-social fixes” work.

Over the course of thirty-nine days in the summer of 2007, the Georgia Ports
Authority pumped more than one million pounds of supplemental oxygen into a three
mile segment of the Savannah River (MACTEC 2008). The “Savannah Harbor
ReOxygenation Demonstration Project”, or “ReOx” as it was called, was designed to
demonstrate the feasibility of a controversial mitigation strategy to improve dissolved
oxygen levels in the Savannah Harbor and offset impacts from the Authority’s proposal
to again deepen the river to improve navigation (MACTEC 2008). Initial water quality

25

modeling indicated that the proposed deepening would exacerbate the harbor’s already
degraded dissolved oxygen levels, threatening vital fisheries habitat and causing
significant concern among waterfront industries that feared the potential effect of the
deepening on the future of their point source discharge permitting (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers 1998a, 1998b). In response, the Ports Authority and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Savannah District proposed a system to artificially oxygenate the river,
offsetting impacts from the deepening and restoring its ability to assimilate oxygendemanding wastes and support important fisheries habitat in the estuary (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers 1998a, 1998b).
Over the last decade, offsets have emerged as a key strategy for mitigating
adverse environmental impacts (most notably, perhaps, those associated with climate
change). Offsets are based on the notion that overall environmental quality can be
improved by compensating for excess adverse impacts (e.g., carbon emissions) in one
location through comparable (or superior) protections in another (e.g., reforestation
programs). Yet critical geographic research suggests that offsets and credits are equally
(if not more) about reorganizing “specific instances of environmental degradation into
new opportunities for profit,” as they are about restoring a degraded nature (Bumpus and
Liverman 2008, p.131; Bakker 2010; Castree 2008a, 2008b; Lohmann 2005). On the one
hand, offsets provide a “spatial fix” to crises of capital accumulation, eliminating the
need for costly reductions at the source through cheaper alternatives elsewhere (Bumpus
and Liverman 2008; Bakker 2010; Castree 2008a, 2008b; Lohmann 2005). On the other
hand, the production of offsets requires translating non-traditional resources (e.g. carbon
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dioxide, wetlands) into calculable and marketable abstractions capable of bearing value
and circulating as commodities (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Robertson 2007, 2012).
In this chapter, I investigate the efforts to improve dissolved oxygen levels in the
Savannah Harbor, asking how, and with what consequences, oxygen injection has
intersected with and transformed modes of water quality regulation in the harbor. I find
that the translation of dissolved oxygen from a biological concentration measured in
milligrams per liter into a geographic object measured in acres of critical habitat gained
or lost allowed mitigation efforts to be concentrated in specific space-times, producing an
aggregate effect of improved water quality and restored habitat without requiring
significant overall reductions in point-source pollution loads. I argue that oxygen
injection and the assemblages of improvement that sustain its operation focus on
producing a “win-win-win” scenario for the harbor’s major users, and increasingly
facilitate water quality’s remaking into forms more amenable to governance and markets.
I show how the predictability afforded by more accurate hydrodynamic modeling
combined with supplemental oxygen injection and the identification of essential fish
habitat enabled scientists, engineers, and regulators to more effectively manage the
harbor’s dissolved oxygen demands in space-time, allowing the states of Georgia and
South Carolina to develop increasingly flexible mechanisms that enable increased point
source pollution loads despite more stringent state water quality standards. In doing so,
the study extends work on the political ecology of water by highlighting the intricate
spatial arrangements necessary to resolve the contradictions of capital accumulation
associated with water quality crises and make “hydro-social fixes” work.
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In the next section, I offer a brief review of water quality regulation in the U.S.,
with a particular emphasis on new modes of water governance. Next, I situate my
research in relation to recent geographical debates on the political ecology of water,
followed by a short discussion of my primary data sources, and methods of analysis. I
develop my arguments through a detailed narrative account of the efforts to improve
dissolved oxygen levels in the Savannah Harbor, showing how the Corps of Engineers
and the Georgia Ports Authority were able to deploy an intricate assembling of
hydrodynamic models, fish habitat, and water quality targets to support superoxygenation as a “hydro-social fix” (Swyngedouw 2013), resolving threats to capital
accumulation and rebalancing the estuary’s contradictory set of dissolved oxygen
demands. In the final section of the chapter, I conclude with a discussion of the practical
implications of the Savannah case for water quality policy in Georgia, as well as its
theoretical implications for future geographic work on the political ecology of water.

Background: dissolved oxygen and water quality regulation in the U.S.
Supplemental oxygen injection is most commonly used as a treatment for
wastewater. Point source discharges place added pressure on rivers by raising their
biological oxygen demand—the amount of dissolved oxygen necessary to support aquatic
resources like fisheries and to break down wastewater from regulated facilities.
Wastewater is typically rich in organic nutrients like nitrogen or phosphorous, and while
these pollutants can be decomposed by aquatic bacteria, their excess availability sparks
explosive bacterial growth that consumes tremendous amounts of oxygen. The net result
is that dissolved oxygen levels drop to the point that larger organisms, like fish, are
unable to survive.
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In coastal river systems like the Savannah, dissolved oxygen levels are largely a
function of flow, and can generally be divided into three issues: first, as channel depth
increases, the ability of oxygen to reach the river bottom decreases, causing lower
average levels of dissolved oxygen at the bottom; second, as the channel dimensions
expand, saltwater is able to move farther upstream, reducing the ability of that water to
accept oxygen from the air; and third, as the channel dimensions increase, the average
flow slows down, further reducing the mixing of oxygen through the water column. The
end result tends to be fairly grim: heavy point source pollution loads combined with
increasing salinity and slow-moving water creates the conditions for treacherously low
levels of dissolved oxygen for aquatic life.
While supplemental oxygen injection has emerged as a relatively recent approach
for restoring dissolved oxygen levels, the most common have included reducing pollution
loads or altering flow regimes to meet applicable water quality standards. Dissolved
oxygen levels are governed primarily the Clean Water Act. Passed in 1972, it was
directed mainly at regulating point and nonpoint source water pollution. Among its most
important provisions, the Clean Water Act introduced the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES)—a permitting system for point-source dischargers based
on national standards—and established the requirement for developing Total Maximum
Daily Loads (TMDLs)—a calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant that a water
body can receive and still safely meet water quality standards—in impaired waterbodies.
TMDLs are more stringent point source pollution limitations, and are developed for
waterbodies when NPDES permits alone are not enough for them to meet applicable state
or federal water quality standards (U.S. EPA 2014). Typically, TMDLs result in
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significant reductions for point source dischargers. Once a TMDL is issued, the NPDES
permits for all point source dischargers in that watershed are revised to reflect the new
wasteload allocation limits (i.e., that portion of the total load allocated to point sources).
But TMDLs emphasis on improving overall water quality brings a distinct change
in the way that pollution loads are distributed and managed, and they have become the
sites of newer approaches to water governance. They have been particularly important in
the development of water quality trading schemes. Trading is designed to provide greater
flexibility to dischargers struggling to reduce their point source pollution loads, allowing
them to meet their permitting limits by purchasing “credits,” or units of pollution
reduction, generated by other facilities. The overall goal is to produce the same
aggregate improvement in water quality at the lowest cost (U.S. EPA 2014).
One of the more recent strategies has been allowing water treatment facilities to
purchase offsets through supplemental oxygen injection (ECO2 2014). Dissolved oxygen
impairment is most frequently identified as the cause of TMDL violations, and advocates
maintain that oxygen-injection – combined with water quality credit and trading
programs – presents an easier, cheaper, and faster way of meeting water quality targets
(ECO2 2014). At the most basic level it enables regulated facilities to discharge above
their permitted limits, as long as enough additional oxygen is supplied to the receiving
waters to keep the facility in compliance (ECO2 2014).

The political ecology of water
The political ecology of water has received sustained attention by critical
geographers in recent years. Scholars have explored ongoing attempts to commodify and
privatize water (Bakker 2004, 2005, 2010; Swyngedouw 2007), as well as the mediating
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role of technological innovations and infrastructures in the provision of water (Gandy
2002; Loftus 2006; Sultana 2013), and changing configurations of socio-political power
in allocating access to and decision-making power over water (Loftus 2005). For these
scholars, water is a “hybrid” object, a technonatural assemblage co-produced through
inseparable socio-political and techno-scientific configurations of humans, nonhumans,
and technologies (Sultana 2013; Swyngedouw 2007, 2013). This work demonstrates how
waterscapes and hydraulic environments are historically and actively produced, the result
of struggles to refashion and reconfigure hydrological systems in the interest of continued
or renewed capital accumulation (Swyngedouw 2009).
Water technologies and infrastructures play a critical role in refashioning
hydrological systems (Gandy 2002; Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008; Kaika 2005;
Swyngedouw 2013). Gandy (2002) demonstrates how water infrastructure constantly
reshaped New York’s water supply. Swyngedouw (2004) similarly demonstrates how
water technologies and infrastructure urbanize water, taming an unruly resource and
making it more amenable to new strategies of accumulation. For these scholars, massive
infrastructure projects designed to control and harness water resources are underpinned
by a logic of modernization (Bakker 2010; Mitchell 2002; Swyngedouw 1999).
Swyngedouw (2004) argues that the hydraulic mission of the state involved remaking
water flow, availability, and value, in order to produce a new waterscape. For these
scholars, re-engineering water resources is a crucial mechanism through which the state
secures the continued functioning of new regimes of accumulation.
Water technologies and infrastructures are saturated with power relations, and
they become key sites for struggle over access to, control over, and distribution of parts

31

of hydrological systems (Swyngedouw 2009). Much of the critical geographic work on
these topics has focused on issues of commodification, privatization, and marketization,
especially in the developing world (Bakker 2010; Loftus 2006). Bakker (2010, 2013), for
instance, has investigated the role of water infrastructures and governance in broader
processes of privatization in the developing world. Von Schintzler (2008) argues that
political subjectivities and notions of citizenship in South Africa are produced through
and bound up in water technologies, infrastructure, and modes of governance. Similarly,
Loftus (2006) shows how water meters regulate social relations and political
opportunities in everyday life. Sultana (2013) demonstrates how tube wells become
important sites for challenging narratives of development, pointing to the ways that
specific technonatural failures reconstitute development subjects and discourses. This
work points to the multiplicity of ways that water technologies and infrastructures
produce or challenge inequitable socio-hydrological conditions.
Water technologies and infrastructure have also proved crucial in providing
“fixes” to crises and contradictions of capital accumulation. Swyngedouw (2013) argues
that desalination provides a “hydro-social” fix to Spain’s recurrent water crises. The
ability to produce more water out of ostensibly “free” ocean water has allowed Spain to
rebalance an increasingly contradictory set of demands on its water resources without
requiring significant reductions or changes in its modernization logic. For Swyngedouw
(2014), desalination represents a transition from a state-centered hydro-structural to a
decentralized market-based environmentalist water framework.
But fixing water quality presents a slightly different challenge than fixing water
quantity. For example, fisheries habitat is not distributed evenly throughout a river

32

system, and in coastal rivers it is defined as much by salinity levels and water
temperature as it is by dissolved oxygen. Each of these elements varies tremendously
within a river, based on a complex interplay of river flow, tide, or point-source discharge
levels. Similarly, not every point source discharger has the same degree of impact on the
river system. A small point source discharge into important upstream spawning habitat,
for instance, may have a more detrimental impact on the system than a larger discharger
down river. Conversely, more oxygen does not simply improve water quality outright; it
has to be located in specific places and times that contribute to habitat or waste
metabolization. In short, fixing water quality is a decidedly spatial activity; the “where”
of fisheries habitats, point source discharges, or oxygen injection are essential to the
process.

Primary data sources, and methods of analysis
Drawing on a range of documentary and archival sources, I offer a detailed
narrative account of the effort to improve dissolved oxygen levels, highlighting the
assemblages of improvement brought together to support superoxygenation as a “hydrosocial fix” and more effectively manage the estuary’s contradictory dissolved oxygen
demands. But improving water quality through superoxygenation has required more than
just adding oxygen to the river system, and my primary interest is in the spatial
arrangement of oxygen injection sites, point source discharge reductions, and critical
fisheries habitat necessary to make superoxygenation “work.”
The primary source of data for this research consists of the documentary record
maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for its “Savannah Harbor Expansion
Project,” the impetus for efforts to restore the river’s dissolved oxygen levels. I rely
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primarily on the project’s documentary record, compiled in its Final Environmental
Impact Statement and General Re-Evaluation Report and maintained online at the
homepage of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District. In particular, I draw
heavily from “Appendix C” of the General Re-evaluation Report and “Appendix N” of
the Final Environmental Impact Statement. The first contains the project’s supplemental
engineering studies, and includes the technical assessments, inter-agency review
comments, and correspondence between state and federal cooperating agencies and their
consultants involved in the ReOxygenation demonstration project. The second contains
the project’s official record of inter-agency coordination, and includes an extensive
archive of meeting summaries, inter-agency memoranda, as well as agenda, transcripts,
meeting notes, and correspondence between the state and federal cooperating agencies.
In addition to these documents, I draw extensively from a second set of records:
those maintained by the project’s “Stakeholders Evaluation Group.” First convened by
the Georgia Ports Authority in 1999, the group was tasked with reviewing and approving
project impacts and mitigation strategies, and consisted of scientists, representatives, and
advocates from a range of state and federal regulatory agencies, industry, non-profit
organizations, and local communities. These records, maintained by the Georgia Ports
Authority at its Savannah Harbor Expansion Project information site, contain an
extensive archive of agenda, meeting transcripts, attendees, meeting notes,
correspondence, technical advisory and committee reports, public comments, decision
documents, news releases, presentations from public meetings, work plans, Corps of
Engineers policy guidance, public notices, supplemental studies, and meeting summaries
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produced in the project’s fifteen year development.4 In particular, I draw on documents
generated by the “Modeling Technical Review Group,” a smaller group of technical
modelling experts from state and federal resource agencies as well as Georgia Ports
Authority consultants tasked with reviewing study proposals and providing
recommendations to stakeholders. These documents include detailed discussions of
negotiations between agency scientists and Ports Authority consultants as they reworked
model inputs and calibration to produce the most acceptable and defensible modelling
results.

Assembling improvement: superoxygenation as hydro-social fix
In 1989, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 4 rejected a sitespecific dissolved oxygen criteria proposed by the Georgia Environmental Protection
Division for the Savannah Harbor (Figure 1). EPA Region 4 concluded that the proposed
seasonal variation of no less than 3.0 mg/L from June through October was inadequate to
protect aquatic life in the upper part of the water column. Despite its rejection, the
seasonal dissolved oxygen standard remained in place until more suitable criteria could
be adopted. But during the initial water quality monitoring conducted in 1997 and 1999
in support of the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project, the harbor was placed on
Georgia’s Section 303(d), or impaired waters, list under the Clean Water Act after failing
to meet the dissolved oxygen criteria for its designated use of “Coastal Fishing.” The
harbor’s listing as an impaired waterway required that the EPA develop and issue a Total
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for the failed standard, placing a new, more stringent

4

Retrieved from: http://sav-harbor.com/ (last accessed 27 August 2014).
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limitation on the amount of oxygen-demanding wastes that could be discharged into the
harbor.
But the TMDL process was complicated by ongoing plans to again deepen the
Savannah River in order to improve navigation and better accommodate the increasingly
larger container vessels that had begun calling at the port. Even with a controlling depth
of 42ft and the river’s 8 foot daily tide range, many of the vessels calling at the port had
to come in light-loaded, or wait off-shore for several hours for the necessary tidal
window, in order to make the trip upriver to the docks. Somewhat unexpectedly, the
Georgia Ports Authority suddenly faced strong opposition from Savannah’s waterfront
manufacturers, who voiced serious concern over the impact that the deepening would

(Figure 1. Overview map of the Savannah Harbor. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012, p.1-2)
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have on the future of their point-source discharging limits. The initial water quality
modeling indicated that the deepening could exacerbate the harbor’s dissolved oxygen
deficit by as much as 1mg/L, and combined with the development of new TMDL
restrictions and a more stringent state water quality standard for the harbor, waterfront
industries began to voice opposition. While the deepening project was meant to secure
new rounds of capital flow at the port, it also posed a tremendous threat to local
industries, whose profits and productivity would be greatly reduced by any major
reductions in their point source permitting levels. In response, the Ports Authority and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District proposed a system to artificially
oxygenate the river, offsetting impacts from the deepening and restoring its ability to
assimilate oxygen-demanding wastes and support important fisheries habitat in the
estuary (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1998a, 1998b). But the technology had never
applied to such a complex estuarine system, and there were tremendous doubts that it
could boost dissolved oxygen levels in the harbor to the point that the river could meet
the applicable water quality standards.

Resolving the problems of quantity – better models, more oxygen, and revised standards
As early as 1998, the Georgia Ports Authority had begun exploring Speece Cone
superoxygenation technology. That summer, Dr. Richard Speece, the designer of the
technology, prepared a preliminary assessment of the anticipated reductions in the harbor,
concluding that the approach was “technologically feasible” (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers 1998b, p.178). Dr. Speece’s assessment, however, had only been performed at
the level of “conceptual design,” and while the Georgia Ports Authority recognized that
the technology would require further investigation in later phases of the project, their Tier
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I Environmental Impact Statement concluded that “alternatives to mitigate for decrease in
[dissolved oxygen] are feasible and practicable” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1998b,
p.178).
The first major challenge came in 2003, when federal and state agencies began
expressing serious reservations about the technical defensibility of the hydrodynamic
models being developed for the deepening project. The models’ accuracy was critical;
changes in the river’s geometry (i.e., the size and shape of the navigation channel) would
radically change its hydrodynamics – altering water volume, velocity, aeration rates, and
vertical mixing. The models would be used to characterize the current spatial and
temporal deficiencies in dissolved oxygen in the harbor, and then be used to predict those
same deficiencies in the “with-project scenario.” These spatial and temporal deficiencies
would, in turn, inform the decisions regarding optimal placement of the oxygen-injection
system and additional mitigation measures to offset impacts to water quality. Early in the
modeling effort, the Georgia Ports Authority’s contractor, Applied Technology &
Management, chose to develop a modified vertical turbulence formula to characterize the
hydrodynamics of the estuary (Applied Technology & Management 1998, n.d.). While a
standard method would have been preferred, ATM concluded that the dynamic
movements of salinity in the harbor could be more accurately modeled with a sitespecific variation (Applied Technology & Management 1998, n.d.). During the first
several years of the modeling effort, the models’ performance had been almost the
exclusive concern of federal and state reviewers, and the site-specific vertical-mixing
method went relatively unnoticed. But in 2003, during a review of the draft dissolved
oxygen model calibration report, questions arose over ATM’s choice of vertical-mixing
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methodology. The approach used an empirically-derived turbulence formula to
determine a vertical-mixing time series, which reviewers described as “not based on the
proper physics of the system” (Applied Technology & Management n.d., Part II p.9).
The final modeling package was delivered in January 2004, but by that time technical
modelers from the Federal agencies, then titled the “Savannah Multi-Agency Review
Team,” expressed serious concerns regarding the site-specific vertical-mixing approach
and the technical defensibility of the models as predictive tools.
In response to growing concerns over the technical defensibility of the models
developed by Applied Technology & Management, the Savannah District requested the
position of federal agencies on models being developed by the EPA for the dissolved
oxygen TMDL in the harbor. The effort used the same 1997/1999 data set collected for
the deepening project but was using a different 3-D hydrodynamic model already
accepted and widely used by the EPA in developing TMDLs. The Corps proposed using
the same model with only minor enhancements to assess impacts from the deepening
project. In April of 2004, the regional heads of the federal agencies informed the Ports
Authority of their intention to reject the models based on the site-specific vertical-mixing
modifications. In May, the federal cooperating agencies submitted a final decision
rejecting the hydrodynamic and dissolved oxygen models being developed by the Ports
Authority as “fundamentally flawed and not technically defensible due to the unique
modifications” (Gerber 2004, p.1). As a result, the federal cooperating agencies chose
instead to pursue refinement of the Plan-B models being used by the EPA in the
development of a TMDL for dissolved oxygen on the lower Savannah, and in 2006,
accepted the models for use in evaluating impacts from channel deepening. The models
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would then be used to quantify (and render spatial) potential project impacts to salinity,
dissolved oxygen, chlorides, wetland conversion, fishery habitat, and others. Most
importantly, the models would be used to identify and predict the temporal and spatial
distribution of dissolved oxygen deficiencies under varying estuary conditions, allowing
the Savannah District to focus mitigation efforts to the sites where it could most
effectively support and protect vital fisheries habitat while eliminating the need for pointsource discharge reductions.
With the harbor’s hydrodynamics and water quality predictably characterized by
the models, the Savannah District began exploring potential technologies to boost
dissolved oxygen levels. In August of 2004, the EPA had released its draft TMDL for
dissolved oxygen in the Savannah Harbor. In it, the EPA noted that the existing Georgia
standard was unattainable under any conditions without an artificial injection of dissolved
oxygen, and indicated that it would pursue limiting point-source discharges in the harbor
to zero pounds per day (EPA 2004). The announcement was met by an uproar from local
industry, who expressed intensified opposition to the deepening project and serious
doubts that such draconian reductions were even in the realm of possibility. EPA
acknowledged the challenge of such drastic reductions – identifying the site-specific
water quality standard as an inappropriate water quality standard for the harbor – and
endorsed “any administrative or regulatory tools available […] to provide flexibility in
such implementation,” noting that it embraced the concept of water quality trading as
mechanism to meet the new limits as long as the total TMDL was not exceeded (EPA
2006, p.11).
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In 2005, the Savannah District contracted with MACTEC Engineering and
Consulting for a study to identify potential measures for improving dissolved oxygen
levels in the estuary. While the Ports Authority and the Savannah District were only
required to mitigate the incremental impacts of the harbor deepening, the draft TMDL
and looming revision to the state water quality standard resulted in a search for a
technology that was potentially scalable, and could, if demonstrated to be successful, be
expanded to bring the entire river up to the applicable (and future) state water quality
standards. Ultimately, MACTEC concluded that the injection of superoxygenated river
water via Speece Cones presented the most cost-effective means for improving dissolved
oxygen levels in the harbor. The technology had been explored by the Ports Authority as
early as 1998, having been used to achieve TMDL targets in other water-bodies –
primarily stagnant canals and reservoirs – but it had yet to be applied to such a complex
estuarine system. In 2007, the Ports Authority contracted with MACTEC to build,
operate, and monitor a full-scale, “exceptionally fast-track” demonstration project of the
Speece Cone superoxygenation technology in time for the critical summer season of 2007
(MACTEC 2008, p.ii). MACTEC designed two 12-ft diameter cones—each capable of
injecting 15,000 pounds of dissolved oxygen per day—and operated the system from a
floating barge along the river. The ReOx project ran over a 40-day period from August 7,
2007 to September 16, 2007, and sought to add nearly 20,000 pounds of dissolved
oxygen per day to the harbor (Figure 2).
Following the conclusion of the demonstration project, the Ports Authority
declared the technology a success. In its 2008 summary report, MACTEC concluded
that, “the ReOx system operation reduced the mid-channel average low tide [dissolved

41

(Figure 2. Savannah Harbor ReOxygenation Demonstration Project. Source: Tetra Tech 2008, p.15)

oxygen] deficit along the three-mile-long target segment by about 0.6 mg/L” (MACTEC
2008, p.ES-2). But according to a review of MACTEC’s summary report by the U.S.
Geological Survey, the report’s claim that the oxygen-injection system had been able to
boost dissolved oxygen levels in the estuary by 0.6 mg/L was a gross over statement,
charging that “the data and discussion in the report did not present a defensible
quantification of contribution of the ReOx injection to the dynamic [dissolved oxygen]
variability of the system. None of the information reviewed supports the conclusion the
ReOx system had a substantial impact on [dissolved oxygen] in the Front River”
(Conrads 2008, n.p.). In fact, the U.S. Geological Survey was able to demonstrate
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similar reductions in the harbor’s dissolved oxygen deficit based on the natural variations
of the moon and tides (Conrads 2008, n.p.). MACTEC provided a supplemental data
report in 2009, revising its claims and arguing that “[c]ontinuous monitoring data from
the barge monitors showed a definite [dissolved oxygen] response due to operation of the
ReOx system indicating that oxygen was added to the harbor particularly in the deeper
layers of the channel where it was injected” (MACTEC 2009, p.3-13) and that “[m]idchannel profiles for both high and low slack tides showed evidence of an oxygenated
plume of water in the vicinity of the ReOx system. Also, transects made at 5 locations
showed definitive evidence of the impact of the ReOx system on [dissolved oxygen]
water quality in the river” (MACTEC 2009, p.4-1). Additionally, MACTEC pointed to
modeling of the ReOx system performed by Tetra Tech which indicated “an increase in
dissolved oxygen concentrations in the harbor area of at least 0.1 mg/L over a 10-mile
reach […] modeling clearly shows a positive effect (or increase) of adding oxygen to the
Savannah Harbor” (Tetra Tech 2009, p.24). But agency modelers raised questions over
Tetra Tech’s near- and far-field modeling approaches. Both the near-field plume
modeling and the far-field modeling were run based on an ambient river time series of
temperature, salinity, and velocity at the injection sites during the summer of 2007 when
the ReOx project occurred. Agency modelers pointed out that these characteristics vary
considerably within the harbor, noting that the injected oxygen may not “perform” in
quite the same way depending on the location of the injection (Tetra Tech 2009).
The modeling effort and the ReOx Demonstration Project were complemented by
a series of regulatory changes by the EPA and the Georgia Environmental Protection
Division which helped to reduce the required amount of dissolved oxygen improvement
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Acceptance of the Hydrodynamic and Water Quality models (2006).
Allow the river's dissolved oxygen deficiency to be more accurately characterized in space. The models are widely used in the
development of TMDLs.

Georgia Ports Authority’s “Savannah Harbor ReOxygenation Demonstration Project” (20072009).
Allows the Georgia Ports Authority and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to demonstrate that oxygen injection is feasible
mitigation strategy. Shows that the technology can successfully add the necessary amount of oxygen to offset impacts from
the deepening.

Georgia issues revised state water quality standard for the Savannah Harbor (2009).
Establishes a more flexible standard closer to South Carolina’s. Dissolved oxygen levels can exhibit up to a 10% deficit from a
water bodies "natural" levels.

EPA issues draft revised TMDL for Dissolved Oxygen for the Savannah Harbor (2010).
Introduces the TMDL Calculator which, "provides an accurate estimation of the DO impact of each discharger and can be used
to evaluate various discharge scenarios and to develop the appropriate TMDL that meets the applicable standard" (U.S. EPA
2010, p.20).

(Figure 3. Resolving the problems of quantity)

(Figure 3). In 2010, the EPA released a revised draft dissolved oxygen TMDL for the
Savannah Harbor. The revision incorporated Georgia’s new state water quality standard,
which more closely matched the stricter standard of South Carolina. More importantly,
the revised TMDL outlined the implementation of a new “TMDL Calculator” to
distribute the waste-load allocations for dischargers on the river. In 2006, EPA Region 4
had set the wasteload allocation for the harbor at zero pounds per day, but by the 2010
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revision the increased predictability afforded by the hydrodynamic and dissolved oxygen
models combined with the potential offsets provided oxygen injection, EPA set the
“initial TMDL target [of dissolved oxygen] is a daily average delta [of dissolved oxygen]
of 0.1 mg/L” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2010, p.22).
The TMDL Calculator had been conceived by Jim Greenfield, with EPA Region
4, and included during the 2002 development of a dissolved oxygen TMDL for the
Charleston Harbor (Cantrell 2013). Effectively, the TMDL Calculator was a spreadsheet
which allowed regulators and industry to calculate numerous scenarios under which a
TMDL’s numeric target could be achieved:

“More than a hundred [Environmental Fluid Dynamics Code] water quality model
simulations were completed to determine the unit response of delta DO in each
TMDL segment per pound of effluent [carbonaceous biochemical oxygen
demand], ammonia, and DO individually for each outfall location. The responses
are linear and additive so once the individual responses are determined, they can
be stored in spreadsheet tables and added together to get the total delta DO from
all discharges. Users adjust effluent loads on the interface tab and the delta DO
results are recalculated instantly […] After the TMDL is finalized, the TMDL
calculator can be used for future reallocations. As long as the DO standard is
maintained as evidenced by the TMDL calculator, future reallocations will be
considered to be consistent with this TMDL and reopening or revision of the
TMDL is not necessary” (Cantrell 2013, p.24).

Based on the hydrodynamic model the tool allowed users to identify critical segments of
the river and, based on a weighting factor for each discharger, take into account each
discharger’s location in the system and impact on the critical segments in order to isolate
the impact of each individual discharger. The calculator was thus able to predict the
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dissolved oxygen deficit associated with almost any combination of loadings. The result
is not a fixed number - a single available load for the system or a series of loads for
various model segments. Rather, the calculator could predict a series of loadings, any of
which could result in a deficit consistent with the TMDL target of 0.1mg/L allowable
dissolved oxygen depression, allowing for a more flexible approach to discharge permit
allocations. The total wasteload allocation could vary depending on the locations of the
individual loads in relation to the critical segments. The TMDL Calculator computes the
dissolved oxygen depression at the critical locations in the estuary in response to various
combinations of individual wastewater loads, which can then be allocated based on the
decision of the states. The TMDL Calculator can be used to divide up the loading to the
system “more efficiently,” based on factors like waste treatability. Most importantly,
“[f]uture reallocations, and changes in the total [wasteload allocation], are possible
without further revision of the TMDL provided the TMDL target is maintained as shown
by the EFDC model and/or TMDL Calculator” (Cantrell 2013, p.iv).
The TMDL Calculator provides regulated industries greater flexibility in meeting
point source reductions. In the case of the Charleston Harbor, for example, the Calculator
allows “additional loading compared to the previous TMDLs due in part to a more
accurate model. The new model more accurately represents estuarine circulation […]
resulting in higher predicted dilution and allowable effluent loading throughout the
system” (Cantrell 2013, p.iii). Calculated in this way, the potential wasteload allocation
in pounds per day falls within a tremendous range, one made significantly larger by
supplemental oxygen injection. The initial target of a 0.1 mg/L dissolved oxygen deficit
resulted in a loading range between 80,000 to 115,000 pounds per day depending on how
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the load was distributed throughout the system (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2010, p.27). But based on an “up to 10% deficit” from the “natural” conditions identified
for the waterbody (as allowed by the state standards), the potential deficit could be
substantially higher than 0.1 mg/L.
Resolving the problem of location – fish-passage ramps and “restored” spawning habitat
In 2011, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control met
with the Corps to discuss a number of remaining issues over proposed injection sites. A
study of Speece Cone application for the San Joaquin River shipping channel suggested
that the technology was not suitable for shallower waters, like many segments of the
Savannah River estuary. The claim was substantial – river depth in the navigation
channel would be nearly 50 feet at high-tide, but other segments of the estuary targeted
for oxygen injection would only be around 15 feet deep (Figure 4). The South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control requested additional modeling runs,
and in July the Corps of Engineers contracted with Tetra Tech to “provide greater
assurance that the Speece cones would perform as designed at the Back River location”
(Tetra Tech 2011, p.2). At issue was how well modeling results of the ReOx project
(operated from a temporary barge in the deepest segments of Front River) could be
extrapolated to permanent Speece Cone installations in other parts of the estuary, the
locations of which were constrained by a number of issues: they needed to be located on
land that was not privately owned, they could not be located in the Savannah National
Wildlife Refuge, they needed to be accessible by road, and they needed electrical utilities
in place to run the Speece Cones.
Most importantly, however, the locations needed to maximize the system’s
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(Figure 4. Back River bathymetry of proposed injection site. Source: Tetra Tech 2011, p.28)

overall impact on the river’s dissolved oxygen levels, especially in relation to areas
identified as known or potential fisheries habitat. As the Corps, the Ports Authority, and
Tetra Tech continued to try and work out the remaining issues of where to locate the
Speece Cones, subsequent modeling runs indicated that the oxygen-injection system
would, at best, be capable of removing the incremental effect of a deeper channel in only
97 percent of the cells in the bottom half of the water column (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers 2012b, p.5-58). At the same time, some cells showed significant improvement
while others show only marginal improvement. And while the Corps argued that, “the
minor impact at distances away from the injection location is balanced by the higher
[dissolved oxygen] levels that would occur close to where the oxygen is added,” state and
federal resource agencies remained unconvinced (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012b,
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p.5-54). Initially, resources agencies expressed concerns over the potential toxicity of
superoxygenated water. However, following several site visits by resource agency staffs
in which there were no observable impacts to fisheries, and based on modeling that
suggested the superoxygenated plume diluted to non-threatening levels within a few feet,
those concerns were resolved.
Despite several flow rerouting and oxygen injection scenarios proposed by the
Corps, additional modeling indicated that a number of impacts to fisheries remained and
endangered shortnose sturgeon were poised to lose several dozen acres of habitat (Figure
5). Fisheries habitat is determined equally by temperature and salinity, and while the
ReOx project seemed to demonstrate, at least conceptually, the ability of the system to
provide the necessary amount of dissolved oxygen to the harbor (resolving, in theory, the
issue of point source reductions for industrial dischargers), it remained unclear as to
whether it could add oxygen in the necessary places to mitigate impacts to fisheries, and
maintain levels of acceptable fish habitat. The National Marine Fisheries Service argued
that using the bottom half of the water column was an inaccurate representation, since
sturgeon are bottom feeders and would encounter dissolved oxygen levels only in the
deepest parts of the water column. While modeling runs showed adult sturgeon gaining
several acres of habitat in the summer, juveniles—unable to tolerate higher salinities or
low dissolved oxygen levels—experienced a substantial loss. Despite gains in adult
habitat from oxygen injection, the loss of spawning habitat from salinity increases created
an additional problem for mitigating impacts to sturgeon, further complicating the
usefulness of superoxygenation. This was an especially important moment: the ability to
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(Figure 5. Habitat losses for fisheries with mitigation. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012b, p.5-86)

mitigate impacts to dissolved oxygen becomes directly linked to the ability to mitigate
impacts to sturgeon and provide suitable fisheries habitat.
Unable to identify any other ways to improve sturgeon habitat in the estuary, the
Corps began exploring ways to improve habitats further upstream. One possibility for
improved sturgeon habitat included the historical spawning grounds up near Augusta
Shoals. For sturgeon to access this upstream habitat the Corps suggested the removal of
the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam. Although dam removal was identified as the
most preferred method, it was not a viable option. The dam had been authorized for
repair and upgrade by Congress in 2000. Additionally, local governments upstream of
the dam opposed removal because of the upstream pool provided recreational uses for
local users. Adding upstream habitat was predicated on the notion that the oxygen
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injection system and flow rerouting would work downstream. If the oxygen injection
system did not work as well as the models predicted, the impacts to fisheries would be
higher than expected. Plus, supplemental modeling runs showed that acceptable sturgeon
habitat was substantially reduced when the 2004 point source loads were added to
average river flows. While only a preliminary assessment, the modeling demonstrated
risks from the compounded impacts of deepening and point source pollution. Unable to
remove the dam, the Savannah District designed a fish-passage ramp in order to provide
access to upstream spawning habitat (Figure 6). The National Marine Fisheries Service
rejected the Corp’s initial design, based on concerns that it would be unable to handle
sufficient river flows and too small for the fish to find. Even more concerning was that
the Corps had no evidence that sturgeon would actually use the ramp, or would try to
move further upstream to spawn. In addition to concerns with the design of the fish
passage, the Service raised concerns that juvenile habitat as shown on the suitability maps
developed by the Corps did not show good agreement with documented habitat. The
conservative estimate of salinity tolerance for juveniles appeared to constrain habitat that
was already actually in use by larger juveniles, in particular a larger “fish hole” in the
upper segments of the river. As a result, the Service proposed increasing the maximum
tolerable salinity for juveniles - from less than 4 parts per thousand to nearly 15 parts per
thousand. After this revision, the habitat maps showed a more accurate depiction of
already existing habitat for juvenile sturgeon. The revisions also reduced the amount of
new habitat that the Corps needed to provide. Despite the increase in juvenile salinity
tolerance, the Fisheries Service continued to voice concerns over areas identified by the
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Georgia

South Carolina
(Figure 6. Fish-passage at the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam.
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012b, Appendix C p.75)

Corps as recovered or restored habitat. Modeling runs continued to produce conflicting
results, and ground-truthing efforts by the Service indicated that areas of the river

identified as “suitable habitat” based on salinity and dissolved oxygen conditions may not
actually be used by or accessible to sturgeon – making the “gains” irrelevant.
Following several more weeks of negotiations, the Fisheries Service accepted the
Corps design for a fish ramp, theoretically “restoring” hundreds of acres of sturgeon
habitat and resolving the locational problems which had plagued the oxygen injection
system. South Carolina continued to express doubts about the ability of the oxygen
injection system to work in upper portions of the harbor, but following a series of
commitments by the Georgia Port Authority and the Corps of Engineers on plans to build
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a bi-state port in Jasper County, South Carolina, they too approved a state water quality
certification approving the project. A protracted legal battle between the Corps of
Engineers and several South Carolina environmental organizations ensued, but it too, was
brought to a conclusion after a series of commitments and concessions from the Georgia
Ports Authority. In 2014, the project was finally included in President Obama’s budget,
and that summer the Corps of Engineers began the initial construction and operation of
the new oxygen injection system.

Conclusions: flexible water quality in the Low Country
The Corps of Engineers’ effort to further deepen the Savannah River seriously
threatened the future of point source permitting levels for Savannah’s waterfront
industries—a situation made vastly worse by the EPA’s parallel effort to develop a new
TMDL and state water quality standard for dissolved oxygen in the harbor. But a
combination of new technologies and practices of spatialization deployed by scientists,
engineers, and regulators provided a way to meet the needs of multiple users in the
harbor, and more effectively manage the river’s dissolved oxygen demands in space-time.
Despite their strikingly unstable combination, the developments described above
gradually provided the conditions to meet the needs of multiple users in the harbor: to
offset the impacts of deepening for the Ports Authority and the Corps, to ease the need for
major reductions by point source dischargers, and to restore fisheries habitat for
shortnose sturgeon. Instead of reducing point source loads, it could be regulated spatially
- based on increasingly accurate hydrodynamic and dissolved oxygen models,
supplemental oxygen injection, and the maintenance of acceptable habitat. More
accurate hydrodynamic models allowed scientists to better predict the spatio-temporal
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deficiencies in dissolved oxygen levels and target specific areas needing improvement.
The ReOx project enabled the Ports Authority to demonstrate that oxygen injection was
technologically feasible, and that the process could successfully increase the amount of
dissolved oxygen throughout the water column. The development of suitable habitat
criteria permitted the Savannah District to translate dissolved oxygen into acres, and to
identify sites where oxygen injection could be the most effective in preserving or
increasing acceptable fisheries habitat. Suitable habitat criteria also facilitated the
District’s identification of potential “restored habitat” above the New Savannah Bluff
Lock and Dam, and the development of a fish-passage ramp enabled the Corps to include
this new acreage in the calculations of habitat lost and gained. Lastly, the development
of a new TMDL Calculator provided greater flexibility to regulated industry in reducing
pollutant loads, allocating point source discharge permits based on the impacts of each
facility relative to the critical segments of the river. Combined, these efforts were able to
eliminate the threat of draconian, across-the-board reductions to point source permit
loads, and resolve the barriers to capital accumulation posed by the deepening project.
But superoxygenation and the assemblages of improvement brought together to
sustain its realization have also increasingly transferred the governance of Savannah’s
water quality to non-state and market actors. The developments described above have
increasingly facilitated more flexible water quality. In 2013, a combined discharger
group along the Savannah River—the Savannah Harbor Committee and the Central
Savannah River Area TMDL Group—came together to negotiate a year-long wasteload
allocation distribution process. Instead of assigning wasteload allocations to dischargers,
EPA and state regulators followed the model recently used in Charleston, allowing
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dischargers to determine among themselves the distributions. This could prove to be a
very slippery slope, and it remains to be seen whether the Corps’ oxygen injection system
will actually improve dissolved oxygen levels in the long-term. Regardless, it has
delivered a mechanism for rebalancing the estuary’s increasingly contradictory dissolved
oxygen demands, providing a “hydro-social fix” to a potential crisis of water quality.
This study contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the political ecology
of water, showing how dissolved oxygen—and the ecological functions it performs—is
remade into a form more suited to governance and markets. And while geographic
scholarship has suggested that water has several unique values and entitlements attached
to it which make it particularly resistant to commodification, its biophysical components
(dissolved oxygen, chlorides, or salinity) or its ecological functions (fisheries habitat or
the metabolization of oxygen-demanding wastes) may not present the same challenges.
As the contradictory demands on rivers continue to grow, future empirical work should
focus on the efforts—and consequences—of scientists, engineers, and regulators
remaking them to be simultaneously more protected and more productive.
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- Chapter 3 Activating memory: adaptive management planning and the politics of
remembering in the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge

Abstract. Increasingly, federal and state regulatory agencies have embraced adaptive
management as an approach for dealing with the uncertainty inherent in governing
complex natural systems. But accepting that policy initiatives and technical science
may (and quite often do) fail has made the approach difficult to implement in practice
and few successful examples exist. And despite a significant body of theoretical
scholarship outlining what adaptive management should entail, little work examines
how it is actually negotiated in practice. In this chapter, I examine the role of
remembering failed policy and faulty science in reconfiguring adaptive management,
and argue that memory-work and the politics of remembering/forgetting provide
important analytic and strategic tools for understanding how institutional barriers to
its implementation are overcome. Through a case study of a controversial harbor
deepening project on the Savannah River, the border between the U.S. states of
Georgia and South Carolina, I demonstrate how practices of remembering worked to
activate the unintended consequences from past harbor deepening and engineering
projects—particularly the fifteen year operation of a Tidegate structure across the
river—legitimizing a substantial reconfiguration of the river’s governance
arrangement. In doing so, this study contributes to a fuller understanding of adaptive
management, revealing the ways in which memory-work and practices of
remembering contribute to adaptive capacity and ecological resilience, and facilitate
its translation from policy to practice.

Early in 2008, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers released an initial summary of
the mitigation plans it would include as part of its proposal to deepen the Savannah River
and improve navigation at the Port of Savannah. The project was expected to have a
number of adverse environmental impacts, and several of the Corps’ mitigation strategies
were being proposed for the first time, including a controversial system to artificially
oxygenate the river. Others, including an extensive series of freshwater diversions and
flow rerouting, were already saddled with a relatively dismal record of success (Winger
and Lasier 1994; Reinert and Peterson 2008). A series of unanticipated impacts from
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previous harbor deepening and engineering projects—a deteriorating system of
freshwater controls in the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge, a collapsed striped bass
fishery, and devastating losses of tidal freshwater wetlands—had left the lower Savannah
River a landscape full of already failed mitigation strategies, and firmly entangled the
District’s proposed mitigation plans with past failures and long-held grievances.
As concerns over the adequacy of the Corps’ proposed mitigation plans
intensified, the project’s Stakeholders Evaluation Group (SEG) adopted a proposal
advocating for a comprehensive adaptive management approach to provide for the longterm viability of the mitigation measures and ensure the health of river. Over the last
several decades, the concept of adaptive management or governance has gained attention
as a strategy for dealing with uncertainty in natural resource management, and it
emphasizes long-term ecological learning as the basis for continually refined
management actions and policies (Stankey et al. 2005; Engle et al. 2011; Williams and
Brown 2013). The Corps agreed to include a post-construction monitoring and adaptive
management as part of the project’s overall mitigation costs, but the SEG maintained that
the plan was vastly inadequate: arbitrarily limiting the post-construction monitoring
period to five years, failing to include funding guarantees for the long-term operation and
maintenance of the mitigation measures, and lacking any specific acceptability criteria or
performance measures that identified what triggered a management intervention and by
whom.
Despite widespread support for integrating adaptive management into resource
decision-making, the concept is notoriously difficult to translate into practice (Lee 1999;
Stankey et al. 2005; Gunderson and Light 2006). In particular, adaptive management’s
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emphasis on social learning, large-scale experimentation, stakeholder decision-making,
and acceptance that policy initiatives may and often do fail, present a number of major
institutional challenges for resource agencies (Gunderson and Light 2006; Stankey et al.
2005; Williams 2011). Resource managers and policymakers tend to be especially riskaverse, and continue to encourage more traditional techno-scientific management
approaches to support policy decisions and funding allocations prior to the
implementation of an action (Gunderson and Light 2006; Stankey et al. 2005). And
while there is relatively widespread agreement on the reasons that adaptive management
tends to fall short on delivery, little scholarly work examines how adaptive governance
arrangements are actually negotiated in practice. In light of the considerable barriers to
adaptive management, I investigate the strategies and tactics deployed by advocates,
asking how institutional resistance and inertia that undermine its implementation are
overcome in practice. I argue that advocates of adaptive management have to
demonstrate that significant opportunities for ecological learning and better resource
protections have been, or are being, overlooked or, at worst, have been categorically
dismissed. One important strategy for doing so is by activating and deploying degraded
landscapes as “sites of counter-memory” (Legg 2005b), those places where the
conventional narrative of techno-scientific management is revealed as inadequate.
In order to secure more comprehensive monitoring and adaptive management,
SEG members activated a landscape full of already failed mitigation strategies as
evidence of overwhelming scientific uncertainty, a tremendously unclear bureaucracy of
agency responsibility, and brazen political obstinacy by the Corps of Engineers and the
Georgia Ports Authority. As debates over mitigation costs raged, remembering these
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failed projects, and refusing to forget them, became key components of the stakeholders’
struggle to ensure more comprehensive adaptive management. I conceptualize this
process as memory-work, the ways in which the past is mobilized as a political tool in the
present (Till 2005). In this chapter, I trace the legacy of one such failure—the fifteen
year operation of a Tidegate structure along a segment of the Savannah River—asking
how, and with what consequences, its collective remembering and forgetting have
intersected with adaptive management and water governance in Savannah. In what
follows, I argue that stakeholders constructed the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge and
the Tidegate as “sites of counter-memory” (Legg 2005b) that undermined the Savannah
District’s techno-scientific knowledge claims and their ability to credibly mitigate project
impacts or protect the estuary. I show how the SEG’s activation of past mitigation
failures and unforeseen impacts reinforced a representation of the Savannah River estuary
as uncertain and fragile, gradually justifying significant expansions of the project’s
mitigation costs and securing significant victories over numerous institutional barriers to
adaptive management. In doing so, this study contributes to a fuller understanding of
adaptive management, revealing the ways in which memory and its material traces are
mobilized as a political resource in disputes over ecological resilience, resource
management, and environmental governance.
In the next section, I offer a brief review of adaptive management policy and
practice, highlighting its key tenets and recent debates that emphasize barriers to its
development and implementation. Next, I situate my analysis in relation to contemporary
scholarship on memory-work and the politics of remembering. I develop my arguments
by tracing the legacy of the Tidegate in Savannah, showing how SEG members activated
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and deployed it as a “site of counter-memory” (Legg 2005b) in order to secure more
comprehensive and protective adaptive management in the harbor and wildlife refuge. In
the final section of the article, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the
Savannah River case for adaptive management policy and practice, arguing that memorywork and the politics of remembering/forgetting provide important analytic and strategic
tools for addressing the numerous challenges of “translating adaptive management from
rhetoric to reality” (Stankey et al. 2005, p.56).

Adaptive management development and implementation in the United States
In 2007, Congress reauthorized the Water Resources Development Act, approving
flood control, navigation, and environmental projects by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. Additionally, the law required that the Corps include and implement adaptive
management in all of its projects, although neither Congress nor Corps of Engineers
Headquarters issued any guidance on what an adaptive management approach might
actually entail. Currently, the Corps identifies adaptive management as one of several
“cross-cutting strategies” for implementing its new Integrated Water Resource
Management framework, and describes it as “a decision process that promotes flexible
decision making that can be adjusted in the face of risks and uncertainties […] as
outcomes from management actions and other events become better understood through
monitoring and improved knowledge” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2011, p.17; also
National Research Council 2004). Adaptive management “accounts for uncertainty
through flexible planning, knowledge sharing—especially between scientists and
decision makers—and enhanced capacity to respond reflexively to multiple and uncertain
processes of change” (Scott et al. 2013, p.281).
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Adaptive management is considered to be one of the most important
developments to have emerged in water resource planning in the past several decades
(Engle et al. 2011). It is perhaps most broadly conceptualized as a management strategy
designed to deal with the inherent uncertainty of governing complex natural systems
(Williams and Brown 2013). The key focus of an adaptive management approach is
ecological and managerial learning through improved knowledge generation in which
“policies become hypotheses and management actions experiments to test these
hypotheses” (Kallis et al. 2009, p.636). A central component of this knowledge process
involves a new emphasis on post-decision monitoring, whereby a continuous process of
monitoring, evaluation, and adjustment are used to better manage complex ecological
systems and bring projects in line with stakeholder goals and objectives. Adaptive
management also outlines a new role for scientists, who are transformed from the only
technical experts to “one of several actors in the learning and knowledge generation
process” (Folke et al. 2005, p.445). A central premise of adaptive management is that
ecological knowledge is not simply incomplete but that it is also elusive (Stankey et al.
2005, p.8; Walters and Holling 1990).
Adaptive management is almost always framed in terms of linked socioecological systems, a concept used to emphasize the dynamic feedback between changes
in the physical environmental and the human systems which alter it. Adaptive
management is closely related to the concept of resilience, or “the capacity of a system to
absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al. 2004,
n.p.). Rather than manage a resource or ecosystem to maintain stability, proponents of
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adaptive governance often aim to increase the resilience of that particular socioecological system, improving feedbacks between the physical environment and the social
institutions that manage it so as to facilitate its long-term existence in different states of
being.
Although adaptive management has been lauded by resource managers, it has
proven immensely difficult to implement in practice and very few successful examples
exist (Kallis et al. 2009). Indeed, Engle et al. (2011, n.p.) suggest that “[w]hile integrated
systems may be more legitimate and accountable than top-down command and control
ones […] systems that exhibit stronger remnants of centralization, e.g., technical bodies,
sectoral dominance, etc., seem to be more equipped to make rapid and conjectural
decisions in response to surprises than those that have successfully transformed into
deliberative, participatory, and pluralistic forums.” In particular, scholars argue that the
primary impediments to adaptive management are political: risk-averse resource agencies
and institutions reluctant to admit (much less learn from) failed management or policy
decisions (Kallis et al. 2009; Stankey et al. 2005).
Collaborative governance arrangements—including those that emphasize adaptive
management—increasingly represent the new paradigm for managing resources (Lemos
and Agrawal 2006). Advocates maintain that they lead to higher-quality decisions, the
result of increased empowerment, accountability, and cost-efficiency from involving
more actors at the local scale (Reed 2008). Yet critics suggest that the rescaling of
governance embodies what Brown and Purcell (2005) call the “local trap,” often falling
victim to an implicit assumption, “that a shift in scale downward to the local implies
greater empowerment for local actors and that rescaling implies that nation-states become
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less important in water management” (Norman and Bakker 2009, p.100). Yet critical
scholarship has demonstrated that such rescaling risks inappropriately characterizing the
“local” as a scale of democratic engagement, one which inherently offers more equitable
and meaningful participation, influence over decision making, agency accountability or
public empowerment (Raco and Flint 2001; Evans 2004).
Despite the emphasis on stakeholder participation, especially as a source of new
knowledge production, these types of arrangements seldom translate into long-lasting
changes in how agencies manage resources. Often, collaborative decision-making fails to
generate the deep institutional changes necessary to alter funding regimes or realign
agency missions with a long-term adaptive approach. Indeed, scholars suggest that
collaborative governance arrangements delegitimize more radical options and opinions
by emphasizing the power of consensus-based decisions, and suggesting that they
represent the ideas agreed upon by all (Kallis et al. 2009). In spite of these challenges,
there have been few case studies that examine how advocates of adaptive management
secure these types of deep institutional changes that bring adaptive management practice
more into line with its ideal, overcoming institutional inertia and structural resistance to
get more protective plans implemented.

Memory-work and the politics of remembering
If the primary impediments to “true” adaptive management lie in the politics and
institutional practices of regulatory agencies, how are advocates to overcome these
barriers? For advocates, this means that the challenge is to demonstrate specific
institutional and programmatic failures; to locate them in specific policies and practices
that can be challenged and changed. A particularly useful way of conceptualizing the
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politics of this demonstrating is through the politics of memory. The politics of memory
pays particular attention to the way that memories are inscribed on the landscape, with
specific emphasis on how these memories come to validate a particular narrative of the
past and, by extension, a particular set of claims on the future. In this chapter, I extend
these ideas to the study of a less obviously “cultural” landscape to those previously
researched in cultural geography: the landscape as produced by technomanagerial
interventions.
The study of memory has attracted renewed attention by cultural geographers in
the last decade (Hoelsher and Alderman 2004; Lorimer 2006; Foote and Azaryahu 2007;
della Dora 2008, 2013). Much of this scholarship has approached the study of memory
as a cultural politics of heritage and identity, exploring how conflicts over public
commemoration or remembrance come to shape the inscription of the material landscape
(Alderman 2000, 2002). This work on the “politics of memory” convincingly
demonstrates how practices of inscription or expression on the landscape work to bestow
legitimacy on political identity (Alderman 2000; Crang and Travlou 2001). One of the
central notions for this body of scholarship is that memory is connected to specific,
visible sites. Nora (1996) describes these concrete, physical places as “sites of memory.”
Being able to be “anchored in place” provides legitimacy and stability to the claims,
concerns, and histories of different groups, validating particular readings of the past
(Hoelsher and Alderman 2004, p.349). Often, these anchors come in the form of nonhuman actants: commemorative markers, historical designations, and other signs that are
active participants in the continual (re)making of landscapes.
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The material landscape is one of the most important components of collective and
personal memory (Till 2005; Legg 2007; della Dora 2008; Wylie 2009). The sights,
sounds, smells, and feel of a person’s physical surroundings act as an “aidemémoire…[that] seeps into, and provokes, memory” (Legg 2007, p.458). Physical
landscape features like mountains or rivers can also become powerful symbols of
memory (Baird 2008; Dwyer 2004). Nora (1996) describes these as “topographical
memory places,” those physical landscape features which evoke an intensified continuity
with the past through their specific location or rootedness (Nora 1996, p.18; Samuel
1996, p.39). Thanks to their ability to remain in place, Ricoeur (2004, p.43) describes
such topographical features as probably the most substantial “guardians of personal and
collective memory.”
Yet, memorials—and the physical landscapes in which they are embedded—can
hide as much as, if not more than, they reveal (Alderman 2002). Different memories
result in different places and landscapes becoming embedded with different meanings.
Landscapes are continuously made and remade, authored by competing political agendas
and saturated with contradictory meanings and values. Part of what makes landscape so
politically powerful is its ability to naturalize appearances, disguising “the historical
dependencies and exploitations through which it and its constituent social relations have
been produced” (Barraclough 2009, p.170; Mitchell 1996; Schein 2006). Mitchell (1996)
demonstrates how the landscape works to hide many of the very forces responsible for its
appearance.
One way of dealing with the selectivity of memory and the power relations that
produce landscape has been to author “sites of counter-memory”: places where the
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conventional or accepted narrative of history is openly challenged. Legg (2005b)
explores the production sites of counter-memory in India, demonstrating how these sites
work to actively resist narratives of partition. Sites of counter-memory are constructed to
actively remember, challenging the state’s practices of collective forgetting that are
intended to narrativize the past in beneficial ways. Legg (2005b, p.182) describes these
sites as sites which “mark times and places in which people have refused to forget. They
can rebut the memory schema of a dominant class, caste, race, or nation, providing an
alternative form of remembering and identity.” Often these sites address the more
melancholic, nostalgic, or emotional dimensions of memory.
Geographers have shown how places with a difficult or traumatic past—Civil War
battlefields, former concentration camps in Germany, or American Indian reservations—
prove particularly challenging to incorporate into wider narratives of national purpose or
identity (Till 2005). These places become sites of collective or organized forgetting, in
an effort to erase difficult or shameful events from the past. A growing number of
scholars have explored the practices and politics of remembering and forgetting trauma or
tragedy (Foote 2003; Colten 2005; Gentry and Alderman 2007). Till (2005), for
example, investigates Berlin as a “haunted” landscape, exploring how lingering presences
and absences continue to reshape the landscape.
Building from these themes, I contribute to conversations in geography on
adaptive management by focusing on the ways in which collective remembering and
forgetting undermine technomanagerial approaches to resource management as it is
forced to account for flawed science and failed policy present on the landscape. Cultural
geographic work has convincingly shown the importance of the material landscape in
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justifying and legitimizing different political claims over others (Alderman 2002; Schein
2006; Barraclough 2009), and it can help us understand the politics of adaptive
management, which is on the surface a very different kind of politics, dealing with a very
different kind of landscape. Scholarship on adaptive management has insufficiently
considered the influence of traumatized landscapes on the credibility of techno-scientific
knowledge claims and management decisions. But if the landscape, conceptualized as a
cultural artifact shaped by uneven power relationships, lends legitimacy to some political
claims over others, then the landscape of the lower Savannah River—a collapsed fishery,
failing freshwater control system, and diminishing freshwater tidal marsh—certainly
seems to work against the Ports Authority and the Corps of Engineers. It is a history of
scientific mismanagement, poor planning, and unaccountability writ large across the
estuary. The goal, then, has been for the Ports Authority and the Corps to deactivate the
memory of the Tidegate, perhaps the most prominent challenge—and potentially
destructive “site of memory”—to the Corps’ narrative of technical expertise and
engineering science.

Primary data sources and methods of analysis
Despite the numerous challenges that continue to frustrate efforts to implement
adaptive management on a large scale, stakeholders in Savannah confronted institutional
inertia and a techno-scientific culture of risk-aversion in order to secure a more openended, flexible, and experimental adaptive management plan. The goal of my analysis in
the following sections has not been to determine whether the monitoring and adaptive
management plan developed in Savannah was a “success,” or if it lives up to the ideals of
adaptive management identified in the literature. Instead, my aim has been to provide an
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analysis of tactics, in which memory and its material traces are mobilized as a political
resource in disputes over water resource governance and adaptive management
implementation. To do so, I rely primarily on archival data, and offer a detailed narrative
account of the plan’s development and evolution, paying specific attention to the ways
that stakeholders actively wielded the memory of the Tidegate—and the landscape left in
the wake of its operation—in order to justify their demands for a more comprehensive
monitoring and adaptive management plan and secure more protections for the estuary.
I draw heavily from two sets of primary sources: the final Environmental Impact
Statement released by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District in January of
2012, and the documentary record of the project’s Stakeholder Evaluation Group
compiled and maintained by the Georgia Ports Authority. Combined, these collections
provide a rich body of material for analysis, including an extensive documentary archive
of agenda, meeting transcripts, attendees, meeting notes, correspondence, technical
advisory and committee reports, public comments, decision documents, news releases,
presentations from public meetings, work plans, Corps’ policy guidance, public notices,
supplemental studies, and meeting summaries produced in the fifteen year development
and negotiation of the project’s final Environmental Impact Statement and General ReEvaluation Report. In particular, I draw extensively from SEG meeting transcripts and
official correspondence between the project’s federal cooperating agencies from 2008 to
2012—those years near the latter-end of the project’s planning when negotiations over
mitigation were at their most intense. These documents provide some of the richest
opportunities to follow agency scientists, public officials, industry representatives, nonprofit organizations, and concerned citizens as they negotiated the finer details of the
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Corps’ monitoring and adaptive management plan. Additionally, I draw from twelve
months of ethnographic fieldwork in Savannah, conducted from August 2012 to August
2013. By August of 2012 the SEG meetings had ended and the deepening project had
moved into federal court in South Carolina, but during this time I made numerous trips to
the wildlife refuge, attended and observed at public meetings throughout the city, and
conducted semi- and unstructured interviews with members of the SEG.

Translating Policy into Practice: Securing Adaptive Management in Savannah
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Georgia Ports Authority began work on a proposal
to deepen the Savannah River. The project was designed to improve navigation for the
growing number of increasingly larger container vessels that service the Port of
Savannah, many of which now have to come in light-loaded or on high-tide to avoid
dragging the river bottom. The Savannah carries substantial amounts of silt, and like
other lowland coastal rivers, its “natural” condition contains a number of islands dividing
the river into a series of slow-moving, shallow, and meandering channels in its lower
reaches - a condition that tends to markedly complicate maintaining commercial
navigation. But the near continuous series of engineering and deepening efforts designed
to improve and stabilize the navigation channel has left a number of unexpected and
damaging effects on the river—including tremendous losses of rare, tidal freshwater
wetlands and vital fisheries habitat in the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge—that
fueled intensified opposition to the Ports Authority’s most recent deepening proposal
from local environmental groups and federal, state, and municipal resource agencies.
In response, the Ports Authority chose to organize a “Stakeholders Evaluation
Group” (SEG) – composed of agency scientists, public officials, industry representatives,
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non-governmental organizations and concerned citizens – to review the deepening’s
potential environmental impacts and approve a consensus mitigation plan. But suspicion
and in-fighting among participants remained high, and the SEG made very little progress
over the course of its first several months as stakeholders struggled to agree on the extent
and magnitude of potential impacts. But as the SEG gradually transitioned into the
second component of its mission—the development of a consensus mitigation plan—the
group’s debates increasingly shifted to the realm of memory: how, stakeholders asked,
would the Ports Authority and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers account for the
project’s high levels of scientific uncertainty, particularly in the face of so many
unanticipated and nearly devastating impacts in the refuge?
On the one hand, several of the Corps’ proposed mitigation measures were being
implemented for the first time, including a massive oxygen injection system designed to
offset the project’s impact on water quality and a fish-passage ramp around the New
Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam intended to mitigate impacts to fisheries. Although
oxygen injection had been used to help improve dissolved oxygen levels in other
impaired waterbodies—primarily reservoirs and stagnant canals—it had never
implemented on so large of a scale, and had never been applied to a dynamic estuarine
system like the Savannah Harbor. On the other hand, the Corps’ hydrodynamic and
water quality models tended to perform poorly on the river’s Back River and Middle
River segments, both of which flowed through the wildlife refuge and were identified as
critical fisheries habitat. Modeling runs produced a series of contradictory results,
predicting reduced salinity levels and increased shifts to saltwater marsh species in the
same locations. As Steve Willis of the Center for a Sustainable Coast lamented, “If we
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can’t predict and measure what might likely happen, and what the consequences would
be at this one point on Abercorn Creek, you know, what about everywhere else” (SEG
2007, p.103).
Activating the Tidegate as a “site of counter-memory”
In the face of growing scientific uncertainty, stakeholders recommended a process
designed to systematically address the inevitable shortcomings and uncertainty in the
mitigation plan. In May of 2008, the SEG approved a memo calling for an adaptive
management approach, recognizing that no predictions made by the Corps would be
entirely accurate or mitigation strategies entirely effective. The memo called for a series
of “contingency procedures” that included the “specification of all assured sources of
funding that will be available to cover the costs of any previously unforeseen corrective
actions or compensation for cost overruns that may need to be pursued to protect public
resources,” the identification of “the criteria to be used to trigger enactment of
contingency plans for controlling adverse effects if and when they arise,” and the
“threshold of conditions that must be ensured to enable the project to remain feasible in
the public interest. If these conditions cannot be maintained, procedures must be clearly
outlined for intervening to prevent the project or its mitigation from causing further
damage to public resources” (SEG 2008, p.1). Will Berson of the Georgia Conservancy,
summed up the feeling succinctly:
“…I want to put this as politely as I can. We could be facing a situation where
the project does not perform as modeled. Let's just pick on something –
oxygenation. It is not – it – there really isn't a warranty here that the Corps and
the federal agencies will make it right, if oxygenation as approached doesn't work.
I mean, as we evaluate this project through the EIS and the final statement, we're
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assuming oxygenation is going to work. If it doesn't, then we have to hope that
the federal agencies can come up with a plan B. And if they don't, hard cheese.
Is that basically the way it goes? […] The project will already be done by the time
we understand the oxygenation system doesn't work. So, you know, where's the
leverage to make the federal agencies do the right thing or come up with
something? […] There isn't ample responsibility on the Corps or the resources
agencies to make it right. I mean, it's kind of like do the best you can” (SEG
2010c, p.69-73).
The “Memo of ’08,” as it became called, was tied to a long history of technoscientific mismanagement and political obstinacy by the Corps of Engineers, particularly
its long-standing refusal to repair the freshwater control system in the wildlife refuge—
built by the Corps in the 1970s as mitigation for a previous deepening project. As Dave
Kyler, then Executive Director of the nonprofit Center for a Sustainable Coast, made
clear, “[t]hose kinds of egregious, flagrant deviations from the management of the project
are why I developed this (adaptive management) memo in the first place” (Kyler quoted
in Landers 2011, n.p.). From 1977 to 1992, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers operated a
series of sediment control works as a general navigation feature of the Savannah Harbor
Navigation Channel. The primary features of the control works included a Tidegate
structure across the Back River and the excavation of a new drainage canal, known as
“New Cut” (Figure 7). The Tidegate would open during incoming tides and close at high
water, forcing the outgoing flow through New Cut and into the Front River. Combined,
the control works were designed to increase water velocities and reduce shoaling in the
navigation channel, ultimately reducing the cost of maintaining the navigation channel.
But as the Corps developed the two projects, in conjunction with an earlier deepening
project authorized in 1965, it became evident that the changes would allow saltwater in
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(Figure 7. The lower reaches of the Savannah River: Front, Middle, Back, and Little Back River segments.
Inset: The Tidegate. Adapted from: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012b, Appendix C p.13, 38)
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the estuary to move further upstream, to the point of threatening the freshwater supply of
the wildlife refuge (Figure 8). As a result, a system of freshwater control works was built
to offset the movement of salinity, including a diversion channel from Little Back
River—a 28,000-foot long freshwater supply canal—and the installation of 17 water
control structures in order to manipulate water levels in the impoundments that make up
the refuge’s managed wetlands (COE 2012b).
Following their installation, the sediment control works dramatically reduced the
cost of maintaining the navigation channel, but they also had a number of unexpected and
nearly devastating effects. Salinity levels in the Back River proved to be much greater
than predicted and the freshwater control structures rusted and failed soon after
construction. Particularly detrimental was New Cut canal, which flushed striped bass
eggs into Front River with the outgoing tide, damaging the fishery to the point that the
“once thriving population nearly collapsed in the late 1980’s due to changes in
bathymetry and increased salinity levels in critical spawning grounds located in the Back
River” (Forester 2010, n.p.).
The control works are essential for the refuge to manage its freshwater
impoundments, an ability which, if lost, would leave the refuge subject to the tides.
Despite calls for the removal of the Tidegate throughout the 1980s, it was not until 1990
that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was finally able to demonstrate conclusive
evidence that its operation was responsible for the saltwater intrusion into the refuge and
the near collapse of the striped bass fishery. New Cut Canal was closed and the Tidegate
taken out operation in 1992, and while the refuge began showing improvement following
the removal of the Tidegate, the fresh water controls continued to deteriorate. The
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Service had been petitioning the Corps to repair the freshwater control system since its
failure in the 1970s, but the Corps insisted that the long-term maintenance and operation
of the system was not their responsibility, saying “once we turn over the project to Fish
and Wildlife, as we have with the refuge, there is not much we can do to help them out .
We don’t know whether it was poorly constructed or a lack of maintenance on their part”
(Lowry quoted in Wills 2001, p.33).
But at the SEG meeting in July of 2008, when the Corps indicated that it would
include an adaptive management approach as part of the project’s mitigation plan, the
legacy of the Tidegate was mobilized by stakeholders who objected to significant

(Figure 8. The Savannah National Wildlife Refuge. Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2015, n.p.)
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discrepancies between the proposal outlined by the Corps and the approach
recommended in the “Memo of ’08.” The plan included a limited amount of funding for
adaptive management at the end of a five year post-construction monitoring period.
According to the Savannah District, the monitoring period would determine “whether the
mitigation is performing as it was intended. So if it is, then there's -- Nothing to adapt. If
something isn't working quite right, then you would change it” (SEG 2010c, p.27). But
the vagueness of the approach prompted a response from David Kyler, of the
nonprofit Center for a Sustainable Coast, who indicated that he understood adaptive
management to be a much more comprehensive process which, “in its widest sense, it [is]
also institutional changes, not just changes in the project; who's doing what and how the
project is administered and managed” (SEG 2006c, p.14-15).
In particular, stakeholders objected to the limited monitoring period and the
Corps’ failure to identify the conditions that would constitute “successful” mitigation.
The omissions prompted a response from Will Berson of the Georgia Conservancy, who
pointed to the Corps’ longstanding refusal to acknowledge the adverse impacts from the
operation of the Tidegate, as evidence of the need for explicit performance criteria,
including specific biological indicators for wetlands and fisheries, which would trigger an
adaptive management intervention:
“I think in some ways it's very difficult to divorce what's happened in the past
with respect to the Savannah River…I guess you might want to have some people,
in addition to the Corps, reviewing impacts at that stage. I'm sort of thinking back
to the tide gate question where people were saying it's causing a problem and the
Corps said it wasn't causing a problem. It ended up being a long time fixing the
problem because you had to prove that there was a problem. I think that's
something you don't want to get into in adaptive management. I think you would
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do well to have a spectrum of folks that were sort of evaluating what the results of
monitoring was […] I think that makes—that increases the confidence level in
what you’re doing and that’s what everybody wants” (emphasis added, SEG
2008b, p.84-86).
Here, Berson mobilizes the memory of the Tidegate to challenge a specific
institutional arrangement in Savannah that inhibits adaptive governance: conflicting
agency missions that limit their ability to work together. This lack of collaborative
decision making prevents feedback between the social and ecological systems, thereby
limiting learning and inhibiting better management decisions. For instance, the Corps’
primary mission is maintain navigation, and while they are required to mitigate any
adverse environmental impacts resulting from their activities, the “success” of this
mitigation is almost always seen through the lens of this mission.
Following installation, two of the project’s most controversial mitigation
features—the oxygen injection system and the fish-passage ramp at the New Savannah
Bluff Lock and Dam—were to become general navigation features of the Savannah
Harbor Navigation Project. This meant that like the Tidegate, they would be maintained
solely by Corps of Engineers, that they would be funded through the Corps’ annual
appropriations process, and that the evaluation of their success would likewise be at the
discretion of the Corps. As Berson points out in the quote above, one of the more
significant problems with the operation of the Tidegate was that the Savannah District
assessed the performance of its own mitigation features, and did so within the context of
its mission to maintain navigation. Without any type of ecological or biological
performance measures the Tidegate—or any future mitigation feature—would,
inevitably, been seen as a success, at least according to the Savannah District, as long as
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it continued to reduce the cost of maintaining the harbor (or, worked in the interest of
maintaining navigation). Without an authoritative mechanism to require the Savannah
District to respond to evaluative criteria other than its own (i.e., reducing the costs to
maintain navigation), stakeholders had no substantive capacity to force the Corps to
correct problems. In theory, Georgia or South Carolina could withdraw their state water
quality certifications but, again, that does not guarantee a timely or even complete
response.
But stakeholders’ most strident objections were to the Corps’ plans to fund
several key components of the mitigation plan, including post-construction monitoring
and adaptive management, through its annual appropriations process. In the face of
lingering doubts that the District’s key mitigation features could even work, and the
requirement that several of them be maintained in perpetuity, the National Marine
Fisheries Service and Fish and Wildlife Service expressed strong opposition to such an
insecure funding stream, noting that “[t]he COE’s record of not providing adequate
maintenance of the mitigation features within the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge
partially substantiates this claim” (Crabtree 2011, p.180), and indicating that “the Corps’
ability to honor past commitments for mitigation affects agency expectations for the
success of future project mitigation” (O’Kane 2009b, p.644). David Kyler, of the
nonprofit Center for a Sustainable Coast, voiced significant frustration with the
requirement to go back to Congress to ask for a separate allotment of funding to address
problems as they arose, lamenting that mitigation costs could be significantly
underestimated and, should corrective measures be necessary, the limited funds would be
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either quickly exhausted or not available in a sufficient timeframe, if at all, relying on
Congressional appropriations:
“What if a mitigation effort, either because of interactive effects of different
mitigation steps taken for different purposes, or because of some just
counterintuitive effect of a mitigation has a greater adverse impact, deviant impact
than just a minor adjustment would allow; what kind of contingency will be built
into the adaptive management process for that? […] In my mind, that deviates
significantly from the recommendation we made […] building in the costs for all
conceivable contingencies as part of the cost of the project. So that delay in
correcting deviant mitigation or deviant impacts of any kind would not be a
problem in future projects as it has been in the past project […] it seems to me
since we base, for example the dynamics of the hydraulics and salinity on
modeling from historic data and historic characteristics of the river, likewise
would we not present an alternative vision for a future that's different than what
we predicted, based on previous failures to predict the future? So if you have
examples of worst case scenarios that have occurred previously, why not use them
as a basis for determining the contingency fund to deal with like deviations in the
future” (emphasis added, SEG 2008b, p.93-96).
These passages worked to mobilize the memory of the Tidegate in order to challenge a
specific set of institutional rigidities in mitigation practice that limit adaptive governance:
funding restrictions that constrain experimentation, monitoring, and learning. Federal
policy restricts the Corps from setting aside unused funds, requiring that any and all
mitigation efforts be given a specific dollar amount beforehand. Similarly, the Corps is
required to treat monitoring and adaptive management as a mitigation cost which, by
2008, had soared to almost $300 million, nearly 50% of the project’s entire cost, and
every additional dollar spent was seen to ultimately reduce both the project’s benefit-tocost ratio and the likelihood that the project would be approved and reauthorized by
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Congress (O’Kane 2009c). As Kyler points out in the above quote, one of the biggest
challenges to fixing the freshwater control works in the refuge was securing the necessary
funding. But the politics of funding were compounded by the history of antagonism
between the Corps and Fish and Wildlife, as neither agency wanted to be held responsible
for the costly repairs, and at the time, there were no real mechanisms in place to identify
who had responsibility over the maintenance and operation of mitigation procedures
(Landers 2011). Although the unintended impacts from the operation of the Tidegate
were from technical uncertainty (i.e., the complex movement of salinity in the harbor),
their solution was largely political: allocating the necessary funds for monitoring,
repairing the freshwater controls, or closing the Tidegate and resuming regular
maintenance dredging. For Kyler, securing a significant contingency fund reduced the
risks from technical uncertainty and increased the river’s adaptive capacity.

The Effects of Remembering on Adaptive Management
By 2009, the Corps’ post-construction monitoring and adaptive management plan
was firmly entangled with its long-standing refusal to repair the freshwater control works
in the refuge (Figure 9). As the late Sam Hamilton, Director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service had made clear, “a prerequisite to any decision by them on further
deepening was a firm demonstration by the Corps that the existing mitigation (water
control system on the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge) will be or are repaired. The
Service views action by the Corps on the existing mitigation systems as providing
assurance that future mitigation will be implemented and maintained in the future”
(USACE 2012b, p.N-670). Prior to his appointment as the National Director of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, Hamilton had served in Atlanta, Georgia as the Southeast
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Regional Director, and had been frequently involved with conflicts in the Savannah
National Wildlife Refuge during his career. In fact, it was Hamilton who received the
apology from the Georgia Ports Authority, following the release of correspondence
between Authority executives indicating that they wanted to “kick F[ish] &W[ildlife]’s
ass in the paper” (Krueger 1999, n.p.). Following an indication that the failing freshwater
control system would be a substantial enough reason for the Service to exert its “kill
switch” authority and deny the project’s approval, the impasse came to an end (Landers
2011, n.p.). Although Corps officials maintained that the threat to the politically
sensitive harbor project was not the primary motivator, the first phase of repairs to the
refuge’s freshwater control structures began in June 2010, months before the release of
the Corp’s Draft Tier II Environmental Impact Statement (Landers 2011; USACE 2012b,
p.E-9).
Activating the techno-scientific management failures of the Tidegate enabled the
project’s federal cooperating agencies to outline several new requirements for approving
the project, primarily in the form of funding guarantees and additional mitigation
commitments. At the SEG meeting in May of 2010, the Corps indicated that they were
exploring the option of setting aside contingency funding through the Ports Authority:
“[T]he last thing we were looking at—well, the basic answer is having a pot of
money is not the way the Corps normally does things—never done that before. It's
not written policy, but they don't have a policy. Well, they have a policy, but it's
not following the policy. So we are still working that, and now we are looking at
being able to give the Port Authority credit, if they put the money—just put it up
there as part of their cost share for the whole project. If they just said well, here's
a pot and you can use that, could we give them credit or would we give them
credit for that” (SEG 2010c, p.12-13).
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(Figure 9. The freshwater supply canal and water control structures. Photo: author.)

Such an approach represented a dramatic change for the Corps, and suggested that
stakeholders’ activation of the failures associated with the operation of the Tidegate were
eroding institutional constraints that undermined the implementation of adaptive
management. The federal agencies agreed that this would be an acceptable compromise,
and at the Executive Steering Committee meeting in September, the Ports Authority
indicated that it would be willing to set aside, in advance, their cost-shared portion of the
monitoring and adaptive management funds in order to satisfy the concerns of the
resource agencies (O’Kane 2010). Nonetheless, many SEG members remained frustrated
by the Corps’ refusal to commit to more extensive adaptive management provisions, and
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in March of 2011 the Southern Environmental Law Center challenged the project in
South Carolina court on behalf of several of the SEG’s long-term members, including the
Savannah Riverkeeper, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, South Carolina
Wildlife Federation, and Conservation Voters of South Carolina. A protracted legal
battle over regulatory jurisdiction ensued.
But following several months of court-ordered arbitration, the two sides reached a
compromise—one with a heavy price for the Ports Authority and the Corps. The
settlement agreement consisted primarily of two components: first, the Ports Authority
would pay $33.5 million for additional mitigation, including $3 million to be used “solely
and exclusively” for water quality monitoring, $3 million to be used for monitoring and
researching fisheries habitat in the estuary, and the remaining $27.5 million for wetland
conservation and restoration efforts in the lower Savannah River watershed (Settlement
Agreement 2013, p.7). Second, and more importantly, the Ports Authority would be
required to establish and maintain an escrow account at the level of $2 million (to be
adjusted annually for inflation), for a period of no less than 50 years after completion of
the project should the Corps fail to provide funding in order to operate and maintain the
long-term integrity of the mitigation measures (Settlement Agreement 2013).
The repairs to the refuge’s freshwater control system were completed in
December 2011, one month before the release of the project’s Final Environmental
Impact Statement in January 2012 (Landers 2011). Although the Settlement Agreement
still failed to provide complete funding guarantees to for the mitigation measures, the
potential for the Savannah River Maritime Commission and the South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control to issue conditional permits and
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authorizations, and then to revoke the water quality permits and cancel the agreement if
certain criteria are not met, nonetheless represented a small victory for stakeholders.
According to the Savannah River Maritime Commission attorney Randy Lowell, “The
key conditions of the permits and authorizations by [the Department of Health and
Environmental Control] and the commission is that if the Corps cannot demonstrate the
dissolved oxygen system will mitigate for the impacts of the project, [the Department of
Health and Environmental Control] and the commission both reserve the right to revoke
the permits, terminate the settlement agreement and re-initiate and re-file the litigation”
(Chourey and Mayle 2013, n.p.). These reassurances, although not officially a
component of the Corps “Monitoring and Adaptive Management Plan,” pointed to the
material effects of remembering the impacts from the Tidegate and its operation on the
Corps mitigation planning in the Savannah Harbor.
Combined, these concerns worked to activate the Tidegate as a “site of countermemory.” Although the Corps failed to include explicit biological criteria or funding
guarantees for specific components of the mitigation plan, the Corps did agree to extend
the monitoring period to ten years, to identify “acceptability criteria” for several water
quality and biologic parameters in the estuary, and to conduct several new studies during
post-construction monitoring, particularly a long-term evaluation of the effectiveness of
the fish-passage ramp at the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam among others. The
Corps’ long-standing refusal to repair the freshwater control works in the wildlife refuge
undermined their ability to credibly maintain the deepening project’s mitigation measures
over the long-term. The memory of these failures—both the technical failure of the
freshwater control system, and the political failure of refusing responsibility—were
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mobilized by stakeholders to secure a more comprehensive set of protections for the
estuary. This included an adaptive management plan that consisted, at least partially, of a
victory over one of the most challenging dimensions of “true” adaptive management: the
politics of funding.

Conclusion
The memory of the Tidegate’s operation played a central role in the SEG’s
negotiations over scientific uncertainty and risk, with stakeholders embedded in a politics
of memory over how impacts and the scientific claims about them are, or should be,
remembered. In Savannah, the credibility of the Corps’ claims about hydrodynamic
modeling, ecosystem remediation, and adaptive management were intimately bound with
the memory of the Tidegate and its impacts. Although not always explicitly present in
the SEG’s debates the failure of the Tidegate and the unanticipated impacts that resulted
from its operation proved immensely difficult to fold into the Corps’ narrative of
engineering science and technical expertise. Instead, the lingering presence of the
Tidegate’s failures that was activated by the SEG ignited a long-standing antagonism
between the Corps and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, ultimately making a
significant difference in the development of the project’s mitigation plan and calculation
of its risks and costs. This became most clear in the case of adaptive management and
monitoring, where concerns over funding guarantees led to the Ports Authority setting
aside funds in order to ensure the long-term viability of mitigation strategies, while
concerns over the viability of the mitigation strategies themselves led to the extension of
the monitoring period to the maximum length of 10 years and the inclusion of specific
mitigation acceptability criteria.
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This work contributes to geographic scholarship on adaptive management by
revealing how it has been implemented in practice, and how institutional resistance to a
more comprehensive approach to adaptive management was overcome. Despite the
numerous challenges that continue to frustrate efforts to implement adaptive management
on a large scale, memory-work and the politics of remembering/forgetting provide
important analytic and strategic tools for confronting institutional inertia and a technoscientific culture of risk aversion in order to secure a more open-ended, flexible, and
experimental adaptive management plan. In particular, this work points to the ways in
which memory and its material traces are mobilized as a political resource in disputes
over resource management and environmental governance.
The Savannah Harbor Expansion Project also carries potential policy
implications, especially as the Corps continues to develop implementation strategies for
its recently required adaptive management approach. Federal policy placed two distinct
yet related constraints on the Corps ability to meet the requirements laid out by state and
federal resource agencies. First, the Savannah District was prohibited from setting aside
a cache of unused money in the event that impacts could exceed predictions. Rather,
mitigation measures had to be translated into specific dollar amounts, which could then
be used to calculate the project’s potential benefit-to-cost ratio. The potential risks, then,
from “scientific uncertainty” had to be translated into the fiscal language of mitigation:
the location and number of monitoring sites, the instrumentation, and the duration of the
monitoring period. Second and perhaps more problematic, was that the necessity of an
estimated cost required an a priori designation of what could be considered an adaptive
management intervention: a list of pre-approved (and pre-priced) adaptive management
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features which placed artificial constraints around the realm of possible responses should
impacts prove different or greater than expected.
The Savannah Harbor Expansion Project also represents a significant shift in the
way that mitigation funding is allocated, specifically the ability to set aside funds into an
escrow account by the non-federal sponsor. Doing so will, at least potentially, allow
decision-makers to respond to ecosystem changes more quickly, reducing the possibility
for long-term irreversible changes to the estuary. The delineation of specific
performance measures and shared decision-making by the resource agencies means that
the Corps will be held accountable to non-human nature as other agencies (with
competing missions) become part of the long-term management and evaluation of the
mitigation features. Adaptive management will, at least for the time being, fall short of
many of the goals identified in the “Memo of ’08,” but as federal policy continues its
slow transition toward a new paradigm of integrated water management, an ability to
remember and thoroughly account for past environmental mistakes becomes more
important.
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- Chapter 4 Harboring risk: making environmental injustice make sense along the Savannah
River

Abstract. Increasingly, geographic research on environmental justice has moved
away from its conventional focus on proximity and spatial distribution, driven, in
part, by a growing conviction that these analyses are both unable to fully account for
the complex ways that space is entangled with environmental injustice, and second,
that they fail to provide powerful explanations of the processes that foster, sustain,
and perpetuate it. In this paper, however, I draw from the political thinking of
Jacques Rancière to explore a different way of conceptualizing distributive justice,
and argue that it provides scholars with a productive set of theoretical tools to
examine the ways in which different spatialities are woven together and deployed as
strategic resources in environmental justice disputes. Drawing from an
environmental justice dispute over air toxics in Savannah, Georgia, I demonstrate
how different constitutions of space—as relational, networked, scalar, and bounded—
overlapped, intersected, and combined in ways to slowly dismantle claims of human
health risk, consolidating a particular way of seeing and thinking about Savannah’s
urban space in which environmental injustice is not and cannot be present. In doing
so, I demonstrate how Rancière’s theorization of space and politics contributes to a
fuller understanding of the spatiality of environmental justice, revealing the ways in
which distribution serves as a mechanism for defining the boundaries of what
becomes sensible, intelligible, and possible.

During its early years in the United States, environmental justice scholarship and
activism focused principally on documenting unequal distributions of hazardous wastes
in low-income and communities of color (e.g., United Church of Christ 1987, Bullard
2000). Increasingly, however, scholars and activists have argued for approaches that
place greater emphasis on other dimensions of environmental justice – including
recognition and participation – in an effort to move beyond simply demonstrating unjust
patterns of distribution and toward explaining the processes that foster, sustain, and
perpetuate them (Schlosberg 2002, 2004, 2007; Walker 2009, 2012). Although these
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scholars argue that the different dimensions of environmental justice are inextricably
intertwined, and that attention to recognition and participation are meant to enrich rather
than replace distributional approaches, the implication has nonetheless been that
distributive questions and approaches are insufficient. Indeed, Walker (2009, p.25) calls
for a “move beyond the distributional,” arguing that such approaches are grounded in a
relatively simplistic notion of Cartesian space that treats risks and injustices largely as a
function of distance and proximity. Early GIS-based analyses operated within this type
of framework, assuming, for instance, that greater numbers of localized polluting
facilities translated directly into higher localized exposures and risks (e.g., United Church
of Christ 1987; Bullard 2000). But the pathways of pollutants are more complex, with
risk and vulnerability dependent upon myriad contributing factors (including age, gender,
access to healthcare, and relative mobility of people and pollutants among others) not
accounted for in simple proximity measures (Kuehn 1997; Bowen 2002; Buzzeli 2007;
Walker 2009).
While endorsing Walker’s (2009) call for a fuller and more robust theorization of
what the spatiality of environmental justice can constitute, I suggest that Walker relies on
a particular conceptualization of distribution, to which I offer an alternative. In this
chapter I draw from the political thinking of Jacques Rancière (1999, 2004, 2009), whose
theorization of politics, I argue, reveals a different spatial dimension of distribution and
provides environmental justice scholars with a set of conceptual tools to examine “the
very space” in which environmental injustice is given to sensory experience and made to
make sense (Rancière 1994, p.152). Specifically, Rancière’s work draws attention to the
ways that configurations and partitions of space—what he calls the “distribution of the
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sensible”—encourage, support, and extend particular orders of governance, ultimately
setting the boundaries of what becomes sensible, intelligible, and possible (Dikeç 2007).
Rather than pursue distribution as a matter of what is already distributed in an empty
Cartesian space (e.g., risks, impacts, vulnerability, or responsibilities in their proper
places and roles), Rancière’s work offers environmental justice scholars an understanding
of distribution as the creation of a shared world of sensibilities that “provides to thought
its picture of the world, supplying the evidence of what can be conceived, discussed, and
disputed” (Tanke 2011, p.2).
To illustrate the usefulness of Rancière’s thought for environmental justice
scholars, I develop these arguments through a case study of environmental impact
assessment at the Port of Savannah in Savannah, Georgia. Over the last two decades, the

(Figure 10. The Savannah Harbor Expansion Project. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012a, p.2.)
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Georgia Ports Authority and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District have
been involved in a massive harbor improvement project designed to further deepen the
Savannah River and better accommodate increasingly larger container vessels calling at
the port (Figure 1). Surprisingly though, despite projected growths in container volume
traffic, the Corps’ environmental impact assessment predicted an overall reduction in the
port’s future air emissions. It ultimately concluded that the harbor deepening project
posed no potential risks to human health and complied with federal environmental justice
policy, noting that “[n]o one identified impacts to environmental justice communities or
children as issues of concern,” and that “representatives of the environmental justice
population have not expressed substantial concerns about the project” (U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers 2010b, p.5-145).
The assessment drew sharp criticism from environmental justice advocates, who
maintained that the Corps’ impact assessments systematically misrepresented the port’s
air emissions, pointing to the District’s failure to perform a Health Impact Assessment,
and its adapted methodology for calculating air toxics from landside truck and rail
operations (Citizens for Environmental Justice 2011a, 2011b; Hricko 2011; EPA ). The
neighborhoods of Hudson Hill, Woodville, and West Savannah—which compose
Savannah’s predominantly African American west-side—are crisscrossed by highways
that service the port (Figure 2), and air toxics from the operation of the Garden City
Terminal’s truck and rail corridors have long been a major concern among residents
(Citizens for Environmental Justice 2011). Despite years of recognized environmental
justice activism in the port’s surrounding neighborhoods and sustained participation by
advocates in the planning and development phases of the deepening project, the port’s
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(Figure 11. The port’s surrounding neighborhoods. Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission 2004, p.6)

representation as a space in which air emissions would be measurably declining,
undermined the possibilities for claiming environmental injustice in its surrounding
neighborhoods.
In what follows, I argue that a shifting series of spatial constitutions—and their
effects on cargo estimates, air quality, truck traffic, diesel reductions, and sustainability
initiatives—enabled the Corps of Engineers to slowly dismantle concerns over human
health risk and disproportionate impact, and legitimize the deepening project’s
compliance with federal environmental justice policy. Drawing primarily from the
project’s documentary record, I demonstrate how a series of “state’s statements,”
(Corrigan and Sayer 1985, p.3) – policy documents, descriptive names, spatial
designations, categorizations, definitions, mappings, and statistics – are used to constitute
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the space of the port differently at different points in the assessment, each of which had a
specific implication for the possibilities of claiming environmental injustice (i.e., each
spatial constitution undermined a slightly different dimension of advocates’ claims, and
reinforced varying components of the Corps’ own assessments). I show how these
different conceptualizations of space—as relational, networked, scalar, and bounded—
overlapped, intersected, and combined in ways to that worked to consolidate and
normalize a particular way of seeing and thinking about Savannah’s urban space in which
environmental injustice is not and cannot be present. After reviewing how space has been
conceptualized in relation to environmental justice and environmental justice activism, I
review the political thinking of Jacques Rancière (1999, 2005, 2009), and argue that his
theorization of politics provides a framework for investigating how configurations of
space delegitimize concerns over human health risk and construct compliance with
federal environmental justice policy. In the final section, I conclude by discussing the
implications of redistributing risk in Savannah, both for future geographic work on
environmental justice and for the practice of environmental impact assessment.

The spatial dimensions of environmental (in)justice
Over the last two decades, geographic scholars have increasingly recognized the
multiple ways that space is entangled with environmental justice (Walker 2009). On the
one hand, scholars and activists have sought to emphasize other conceptualizations of
justice at work in the environmental justice movement (Schlosberg 2002, 2004, 2007,
2013). When environmental justice scholarship and activism emerged in the U.S., it was
primarily concerned with distributive injustices, or “who gets what” with respect to
environmental “bads.” To a large degree this has remained the analytical focus of
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environmental justice and activism in the U.S., and analyses have tended to orient around
documenting unequal distributions of hazardous wastes in low-income and communities
of color in the U.S. But as the environmental justice movement has expanded in scope
and extent, scholars and activists have increasingly sought to incorporate other
dimensions of “justice” – particularly as recognition and participation – into their
analyses, in an effort to move from demonstrating injustice to explaining it (Schlosberg
2004, 2007, 2013; Walker 2009). This scholarship points to the ways that procedural
injustices—failures to recognize particular people and place identities, or inadequate
access to and participation in environmental decision-making—sustain and support
environmental inequalities.
On the other hand, environmental justice scholars and activists have increasingly
sought to rethink many of the key concepts (i.e., acceptable risk, race, waste, health) that
animate the struggle and condition its political possibilities. The work of Laura Pulido
(1996, 2000), for example, has provided an exceptionally important intervention,
rethinking environmental racism and injustice through the lens of white privilege, “the
hegemonic structures, practices, and ideologies that reproduce whites’ privileged status”
(2000, p.15). Rather than locate environmental racism and injustice in intentional,
discriminatory acts of hazardous waste facility siting, Pulido demonstrates how
distributive injustices are produced and maintained through a more subtle operation of
white privilege which allowed whites to move away from polluted spaces and lowincome communities of color, consolidating spaces of homogeneous whiteness in the
suburbs and helping make the benefits of white privilege possible. This work has
convincingly demonstrated the myriad ways that social processes operating in other

115

places and at broader spatial scales link to and fosters the conditions that create
distributional injustices. Reworking the spatiality of environmental racism and injustice
as white privilege draws attention to the historical-geographical production of places, and
points to the relatively mundane urban land-use practices of zoning, real estate
development, or historic preservation through which uneven environmental conditions
are produced and maintained in places.
Other scholars have deployed these insights to rethink the spatiality of risk itself.
Holifield (2012) shows how environmental injustice emerges from the affirmation and
translation of misrecognized historical-geographical relationships of place and territory in
the measurement and calculation of risks. In his analysis of human health risk
assessment on the Leech Lake Reservation in northern Minnesota, Holifield (2012)
demonstrates how the risk assessment process failed to account for the distinctiveness of
the reservation, and the unique historical and geographical relationships that shaped it as
a place and territory. In this case, environmental injustice was not simply the result of
distributive injustices and increased exposures. Instead, those distributive injustices were
the result of failing to recognize the reservation as a unique space with a distinct
assemblage of human and non-human relations that differed considerably from EPA’s
standard approach to calculating exposure scenarios.
This increasing spatial complexity of risk, exposure, and injustice has been met by
a range of different strategies from environmental justice activists, and a significant body
of geographical scholarship has productively theorized their efforts as a politics of scale
(e.g. Towers 2000; Kurtz 2003; Bickerstaff and Agyeman 2009). This work points to the
ways that activists activate different spatial scales in order to construct grievances, assign
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responsibility, or mobilize resources. The work of Hilda Kurtz (2002, 2003) has been
particularly influential, theorizing environmental justice activism through the lens of
scale frames, “the discursive practices that construct meaningful (and actionable)
linkages between the scale at which a social problem is experience and the scale(s) at
which it could be politically addressed or resolved” (2003, p.894). Through her analysis
of the scale frames activated in response to a controversial siting proposal in Louisiana,
Kurtz demonstrates the different ways that activists construct and mobilize geographic
scales in order to access necessary resources (be they economic, political, or social) in
order to respond to and challenge perceived injustices.
While numerous scholars have demonstrated how environmental justice activism
can be a politics of scale (Kurtz 2002, 2003; Towers 2000; Bickerstaff and Agyeman
2009), others have shown how it can also be a politics of place, territory, and networks.
In his study of an environmental justice dispute surrounding a risk assessment, Holifield
(2009) shows how locally situated actors constructed a “counter-network” in order to
challenge the prevailing representation of water quality in an underground aquifer. But
rather than see this process merely as a politics of (re)scaling – connecting to ostensibly
“bigger” or more powerful actors in other places – Holifield demonstrates how activists
deployed a strategy of differential positioning in order to construct a credible counterrepresentation of the risk assessment. He suggests that it results from the prevailing view
of the science-policy interface in which credibility is established through a boundarymaking process that distinguishes science (a set of impartial outsiders) from politics (a set
of partial insiders).
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Despite these insights, the spatiality of environmental justice remains under
theorized and little attention is given to the active role of different spatial constructs in
configuring the spaces of injustice and of activism (although see Kurtz 2003; Bickerstaff
and Agyeman 2009; Towers 2000 for exceptions). Walker (2009) has called for more
nuanced theoretical and methodological approaches for investigating the multiple spatial
dimensions of environmental injustice, and that focus analytical attention on how
different spatialities are deployed simultaneously in ways that can either support or erode
environmental justice claims. Doing so requires attending to the practices through which
different dimensions of space are constituted in environmental justice disputes, and how
they are deployed as strategic resources that define the areas to be treated, associate
particular sets of problems with them, and encourage a particular way of thinking about
them. I contribute to ongoing research in geography on the spatiality of environmental
justice by investigating how multiple spatial constructs are deployed simultaneously, and
showing how different spatial configurations are used to destabilize different dimensions
of justice at once. In short, how space is conceptualized matters for the expression and
realization of environmental justice. In the next section, I argue that the political thinking
of Jacques Rancière provides a useful theoretical framework for analyzing the ways that
different conceptualizations of space combine, overlap, and intersect to destabilize justice
claims.
Rancière’s politics, police, and distribution of the sensible
Geographers have drawn on Rancière’s influential rethinking of politics to
explore how systems of distribution and legitimization work to consolidate a particular
spatial order and circumscribe political possibilities in the interest of capital and the state
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(Dikeç 2007a, 2013; Swyngedouw 2011). This work builds on Rancière’s notion of the
police, which refers to an established set of spatial orderings in place to organize and
arrange things and people in their “proper places,” determining the make-up and
arrangement of possible experience (Rancière 1999, p.28).
The police is based on a particular regime of representation, what Rancière
describes as the distribution of the sensible, defined as “that system of sensible evidences
that discloses at once the existence of a common [i.e. the whole to be governed] and the
partitions that define the respective places and parts in it” (Rancière quoted in Dikeç
2007a, p. 18). The system of sensible evidences – the distribution of the sensible –
arranges the perceptible givens of a situation, defining how and what is within the realm
of possible experience, or what is made common to the senses. The police, then, is a
system of organizing and arranging space, the essence of which “is not repression but
distribution – distribution of places, people, names, functions, authorities, activities, and
so on – and the normalization of this distribution” (emphasis original, Dikeç 2007a,
p.19). The inherent spatiality of the police forms the basis of Rancière’s conception of
politics, which he describes simply as any activity which “shifts a body from the place
assigned to it or changes a place’s function. It makes visible what had no business being
seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes
understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière 1999, p.30).
Politics, too, is an explicitly spatial activity, as it puts into question the very distributions
of the police and its partitioned spaces.
But why is the consolidation of the police – as a system of organizing and
arranging space “properly” – important, and how is it useful for analysis of
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environmental justice? Perhaps most importantly, the police delineates the “givens” of a
situation; it sets the boundaries of what a place is, what happens within it, and who can
speak for it. Rancière’s theorization is important because it draws attention to the ways
that space is constructed and deployed. Rancière’s conceptualization of the police points
to the need attend to environmental injustice as the system of distributing and
legitimizing people and things in their “proper place.” In this vein, it requires attending
to the contested processes and practices of place-making that have shaped, “not merely
the collection of discourses or systems of ideas; it is the configuration of the ‘very space’,
as Rancière put it, in which certain discourses and ideas are inscribed and articulated,
certain objects are given to sensory experience, and made to make sense” (Dikeç 2013,
p.30). Environmental impact and human health risk assessment are guided by particular
ways of imagining space, which have in turn, specific implications for the constitution of
problems and formulation of possible solutions.
Data and methods: the “state’s statements”
Following Dikeç (2007a), my approach to impact assessment starts from a central
premise to consider space not as given, but as produced through various practices of
articulation. The environmental impact assessment process does not merely act on a
predefined space of the “lower Savannah River estuary.” Rather, impact assessment is the
very process that creates it; defining what is in, what isn’t, which things are related, and
how, which things aren’t and why. Different ways of conceiving space, then, have
different implications for the composition of problems and the formulations of solutions
to them. I see impact assessment as a particular regime of representation that
consolidates a certain spatial order through descriptive names, spatial designations,
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categorizations, definitions, mappings, and statistics. In this sense, it is place-making
practice that spatially defines the areas to be treated, associates problems with them,
generates a certain discourse about them, and proposes solutions accordingly.
My primary interest here is the way in which the environmental impact
assessment process puts into place certain “sensible evidences,” – policy documents,
descriptive names, spatial designations, categorizations, definitions, mappings, and
statistics – that, in turn, produce particular effects: they “help to consolidate a particular
spatial order and encourage a certain way to think about it” (Dikec 2007a, p.6). But how
to get at these “sensible evidences”? In practice, this is where I draw on Corrigan and
Sayer’s (1985) notion of “state’s statements,” in order to trace how space is constituted
by the State—and by ‘the State’ here I mean the US Army Corps of Engineers and the
Georgia Ports Authority—and to explore how particular characteristics (i.e. safety or
sustainability, for instance) become articulated with different places, and with what
effect:

“States, if the pun be forgiven, state; the arcane rituals of a court of law, the
formulae of royal assent to an Act of Parliament, visits of school inspectors, are
all statements. They define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social
activity and individual and collective identity; they regulate, in empirically
specifiable ways, much—very much, by the twentieth century—of social life.
Indeed, in this sense ‘the State’ never stops talking” (Corrigan and Sayer 1985,
p.3)

Specifically, I ask: How has the Savannah District demonstrated that the deepening
project poses no risk to public health and complies with federal environmental justice
policy? Secondly, how have the Savannah District’s impact assessments (re)made the
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urban-ecological spaces of the city, and with what consequences? In what follows, I
examine 4 of these “state’s statements” – the Corps of Engineers’ Multiport Analysis
issued in 2006, its Air Emission Inventory issued in 2010, and the draft and final versions
of its Environmental Impact Statement issued in 2010 and 2012, respectively. The
Multiport Analysis is included in Appendix A of the project’s General Re-Evaluation
Report (GRR), which documents the project’s planning process and the identification of
its National Economic Development benefits – those accrued to the nation as a result of
the project. The Air Emission Inventory is included as Appendix K of the project’s
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which is a detailed evaluation of the proposed
action, its affected environment, the environmental consequences of the action, and any
feasible alternatives.

Rearranging a problematic space: making environmental injustice make sense
Late in the fall of 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District
released the draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for its proposal to further
deepen the Savannah River and better accommodate the increasingly larger vessels
calling at the port. Despite projected growths in container volume traffic, the District
predicted an overall reduction in the port’s future air emissions, ultimately concluding
that the project posed no potential risks to human health, complied with federal
environmental justice policy project, and would contribute to a long-term improvement in
air quality (USACE 2010). At the same time, the District maintained that environmental
justice communities were “essentially absent” (p.5-192) from the proposed project area,
and had themselves failed to raise any “substantial concerns” (p.5-145) about the
deepening (USACE 2010).
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The assessments drew sharp criticism from environmental justice advocates, who
argued that the District’s adapted methodology for calculating air toxics from landside
truck and rail operations systematically misrepresented the port’s air emissions and
erased significant risks to human health (Citizens for Environmental Justice 2011a,
2011b; Fleming 2011; Hricko 2011). The EPA voiced strident objections to the Corps’
refusal to include a screening level risk assessment in the port’s surrounding
neighborhoods, noting that it had provided guidance – and examples from other ports –
several times over the years regarding air quality assessment and environmental justice in
goods movement corridors (Fleming 2011). In a press release from the Savannah-based
Citizens for Environmental Justice, Reverend Vernell Cutter responded to the draft EIS
saying, “This is an affront to our community to claim we have no concerns when in fact
many of us have attended the past public meetings and have questioned their documents
which claim that there will be no impacts to our environment and health” (Citizens for
Environmental Justice 2011a, n.p.).

Capping port growth: relational space
At the center of the conflict was the production and application of a customized
economic model—the first in the country developed for container cargo and designed to
be the new standard for harbor improvement projects—which, according to the USACE,
was necessary to more fully account for the changing trends in global shipping:
increasing containerization, fewer yet larger container vessels, and the consolidation of
trade routes (USACE 2010a). In defending its assessments, the Savannah District
pointed to its 2006 Multiport Analysis, the source of one of the project’s foundational—
and most controversial—economic assumptions: that the rate of growth in the volume of
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container traffic entering Savannah would not increase with or without the deepening.
The multiport analysis is a systematic assessment of the effects of the deepening, or the
“with-project condition,” on other ports, and it is one of the primary components of
determining a project’s potential “National Economic Development” benefits. These are
benefits that would accrue to the nation as a result of the project’s construction, and help
to determine its benefit-to-cost ratio. The multiport analysis also includes the effects of
authorized projects at other ports on the with-project and without project conditions.
According to the report:

“The analysis determined that with-project conditions would not result in a
diversion of containers from other ports...there would be no substantial changes in
the origins and destinations of imports and exports to key U.S. markets served by
Savannah. Given this study’s findings, a basic assumption for the SHEP
Economic Appendix would be no substantial changes in hinterland service area
and therefore no change in overall cargo without and with channel improvements
at Savannah harbor” (p.163-4)
The report identified Savannah’s position in a wider relational geography, one where
leases with shipping lines, wharfage fees, pilotage costs, tariffs, and expected population
growth in major cities that fell within each port’s respective hinterland proved to be more
important than the new depth of the harbor. According to the report, a deeper channel
was not projected to alter the port’s competitive advantage among Gulf and East coast
ports, and while cargo volumes would continue to grow, no new cargo would be diverted
to Savannah. What this meant was that there would be no diversions of cargo that
traditionally went to other ports. According to the District, it was a relatively
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conservative estimate. To argue that the deepening project would alter the port’s
competitive advantage would be to artificially inflate its benefit-to-cost ratio.
The major consequence of locating the Garden City Terminal within this wider
relational space was to cap the port’s potential future cargo growth. According to the
District’s assessments, cargo volumes would continue to grow at the same rate with or
without the project. However, a deeper channel would allow for this projected growth to
be consolidated onto fewer, larger container vessels. The end result would be that the
same amount of cargo could be moved with fewer ship, train, and truck trips, and without
any new growth diverted from other ports, the Corps concluded that the deepening would
result in fewer overall vessel trips. With no new growth resulting from the deepening,
the physical constraints of the river channel and the landside handling capacity of the
terminal would ultimately limit the amount containers that could be processed at the port.
Accordingly, fewer vessels, despite their increased size and larger loads, would result in
fewer emissions. The report identified the year 2030 as the time when the Garden City
Terminal would reach its landside handling build-out capacity of 6.5 million containers,
at which point the physical dimensions of the river and the size of the terminal simply
would not allow container volume to continue to grow. Based on the assumptions and
constraints provided by conceptualizing the Garden City Terminal within this relational
space, the Savannah District estimated that current and future port emissions (including
air toxics) would hold constant beyond the year 2032—based on the assessment that
cargo volumes will have already reached their peak. Simply, if cargo volumes could not
grow past a certain point, then neither could emissions.
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Reducing emissions: scalar space
The Multiport Analysis—and its conclusion that the deepening project would not
alter the port’s competitive advantage—drew sharp criticism in the years following its
release. But it was Corps’ Air Quality Analysis, also issued in 2006, that generated more
strident objections. The analysis was meant to determine the project’s effect on the port’s
overall contribution to county emissions—calculating how more truck and rail
movements, on-terminal container handling, and larger container vessels would impact
local air quality. The assessment was dismissed by EPA, who rejected the Corps’
decision not to include landside cargo handling equipment, air toxics, or ship movements
from private terminals in the harbor in the analysis.
In 2010 the Savannah District released its updated Air Emission Inventory,
pointing to a suite of ongoing initiatives by the EPA, the Ports Authority, and the Georgia
Department of Transportation which had drastically reduced diesel consumption (and, by
extension, air toxics) at the port, noting that, “In 2008—two years ahead of the federal
mandate—GPA completed its conversion of yard cranes, trucks and other equipment to
cleaner-burning ultra-low-sulfur-diesel (ULSD), cutting emissions by an additional 10
percent” (USACE 2010c, p.100). In May of 2004, the EPA issued its Clean Air Nonroad
Diesel Rule, designed to reduce the amount of sulfur present in diesel fuel. Prior to 2006,
stationary diesel engines, which are primarily used for power generation, were not
regulated at a federal level. Then, in March 2007 – and as an extension of the Nonroad
Diesel Rule – the EPA announced new emission standards, to be phased in over several
years, for locomotives and marine diesel engines. The recent emphasis on emissions
reductions has been expanded into a wider Sustainability Initiative by the GPA. The
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transportation cost savings initiated by reductions in diesel consumption have been
accommodated by new capital investments, including refrigeration systems, a new
lighting control system, and “green” building materials.
The report identified Savannah’s position in a wider scalar space, one where
federal policy initiatives—especially EPA’s Clean Air Non-road Diesel Rule—and newly
opened sources of federal funding had systematically reduced the risks associated with
emissions from port operations. In 2009, the GPA issued its new “Environmental
Policy,” initiating a series of new capital investments to further reduce diesel
consumption and associated emissions from landside handling equipment, noting that “In
2010, the EPA awarded the GPA a ‘Diesel Emissions Reduction’ Grant to convert 17
rubber tire gantry cranes (RTGs), one of the primary types of container handling
equipment, from diesel to electricity” (USACE 2010c, p.101).
The major consequence of locating the Garden City Terminal within this scalar
geography was to dramatically reduce projected emissions. The report identified the
efforts of the EPA and the GPA to reduce diesel consumption as the reason behind
adapting the calculation of air toxics—using lower emission estimates for truck, rail, and
diesel engines based on future transitions to ultra-low-sulfur-diesel, including emissions
standards not set to take place for several years. Transitions to ultra-low-sulfur-diesel
would substantially reduce the amount of emissions produced by ships while
improvements to landside handling equipment reduced the amount of diesel used to move
containers within the terminal, substantially reducing the level of emissions coming from
the port.
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Moving emissions: networked space
Among the GPA’s upgrades were four electric super-post Panamax cranes,
intended to both reduce emissions and increase the speed with which cargo was unloaded.
According to the Savannah District, these aggressive upgrades – the result of locating the
Garden city Terminal within a wider scalar hierarchy – not only reduced the amount of
diesel, they also increased the mobility with which containers, and presumably air toxics,
moved out of the space of the port. The reductions in diesel fuel accompanied by a
greater use of rail to move containers and the addition of a third set of gates to reduce
truck idling all resulted in significant calculated reductions in fuel consumption and toxic
air emissions. In its assessment of potential impacts to low-income communities, the
District’s draft EIS included reference to substantial investments by the Georgia Ports and
the State of Georgia to improve the highway system outside the terminal and the port’s
on terminal rail connections, noting that:

"In 2010, the State of Georgia approved $120 million in bond revenue for use
toward completing the Jimmy DeLoach Highway from Interstate 95 to the Garden
City Terminal...Additionally, the Georgia Department of Transportation’s longterm highway plan includes construction of the Brampton Road Connector which
will provide direct access from the Garden City Terminal to Interstate 516…The
completion of those roads will remove terminal traffic from neighborhoods and
lessen congestion and the accompanying air quality impacts" (USACE 2010b,
p.5-194).
The report identified the Garden City Terminal’s location within a wider networked
space, one where new interstate highway connections and the intensified use of rail lines
to move freight, were dramatically improving the speed and efficiency with which
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(Figure 12. Proposed road improvements surrounding Garden City Terminal.
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012b, p.5-196)

containers were being moved out of the port (Figure 3). Aggressive upgrades made by
the GPA to reduce turn-around times in the harbor, increased on-terminal rail
connectivity, and new highway projects designed to increase truck access to Interstate-95
had made the GCT the most connected port in the Southeast. In short, more intensified
network connections increased the Georgia Ports capacity to move containers and their
associated emissions through the Garden City Terminal. The major consequence of
locating the Garden City Terminal within this wider networked geography was to
increase the spatio-temporal mobility of containers at the port.
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Defining the proper site at risk: bounded space
In addition to highlighting the variety of ongoing efforts to improve air quality at
the port, the Savannah District also pointed to Chatham County’s history of consistently
meeting or exceeding National Ambient Air Quality Standards. According to the
District, Chatham County’s designation as “in attainment” for the EPA’s six criteria
pollutants eliminated the need to perform a screening level risk assessment. The District
was also able to compare its estimated port emissions with National Emission Inventory
data from 2002 and 2005. According to these comparisons, the Savannah District was
able to show that the port was only a minor contributor to the county’s overall air quality
emissions. In general, the air toxic values for the port in 2008 are significantly lower
than the 2002 values for Chatham County (USACE 2010c).
Another consequence of locating the Garden City Terminal within a wider
networked space was to extend the area over which potential emissions were spread.
Following the release of the draft EIS, the EPA raised concerns over the Savannah
District’s environmental justice assessment – especially its calculation of the project
area’s demographics. The Corps’ analysis included two variables – “poverty levels” and
“percent minority” – mapped by Census tract in the upper end of the harbor. The report
argued that “[m]ore detailed analyses - such as dispersion analyses to identify ‘hot spots’
of pollution - could be conducted. However, the Port is not a major contributor to the
overall emissions in the County. When coupled with the dispersed nature of many of
those ‘Port’ emissions along the 34-mile length of the navigation channel...such
additional analyses are not warranted” (USACE 2010, p.K-108).
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EPA’s major criticism was the Corps’ failure to include a comparative analysis of
these areas to surrounding towns, and wider Chatham and Jasper Counties. In its 2012
final EIS the Savannah District expanded its demographic analysis – comparing what it
called the project’s “Area of Interest” with two “Base Areas.” The “Area of Interest”
included the census tracts located along the navigation channel from the Garden City
Terminal to the mouth of the river, while the two “Base Areas” included: one, the
populations of the surrounding towns and cities (Savannah, Garden City, Port
Wentworth, Pooler); and two, the populations of Chatham and Jasper Counties. Doing
so, however, allowed the Savannah District to include the affluent and overwhelmingly
white National Historic Landmark District, Whitemarsh, Wilmington, and Tybee islands,
in its demographic analysis, vastly reducing the percentage of low-income communities
of color in the “Area of Interest” and making it more decidedly more similar when
compared to the surrounding cities or counties (Figure 4).
Additionally, the report argued that the proximity of Savannah’s iconic “National
Historic Landmark District”—the area of Savannah’s downtown laid out according to
James Oglethorpe’s original town plan of wards, squares, and garden lots—effectively
eliminated the possibility for potential disproportionate impacts based on an absence of
environmental justice populations, noting that:

“[H]arbor deepening alternatives consist of deepening the navigation channel
from the ocean past the City’s Historic District to the existing Garden City
Terminal...The residential area along River Street (located in the center of
Savannah) contains a relatively affluent community…As a result, dredging
activities and shipping activities will not have a disproportionate impact on
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environmental justice populations in Georgia, because they are essentially absent
from the areas adjacent to the proposed construction” (USACE 2012b, p.5-191-2).
The report identified the Garden City Terminal’s location within a bounded political
space – Chatham County – where affluent white residential areas line the riverfront over
the majority of its course. Activating the National Historic Landmark District as the
closest residential area to the proposed construction resonated deeply with conventionally
held definitions of environmental injustice as an outcome of proximity and distance. But
the real importance of this passage was that it redefined the proper site at risk. The
resulting logic was subtle but powerful: even if there are possible human health risks that
would occur as a result of the project, these risks would be incurred by affluent whites.

(Figure 13. Savannah’s National Landmark Historic District.
Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission 2011, n.p.)
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The logic, though, does more than simply associate risks with affluent whites. The
passage deploys the National Historic Landmark District—and the ostensible absence of
EJ populations—devoid of its specific historical geographic context, as the unproblematic
and “natural” reality of Savannah’s urban space. The major consequence of locating the
Garden City Terminal within this bounded political space was to redistribute risk: one, to
spread it over the 34-mile length of the navigation channel, eliminating the possibility
that air toxics be concentrated in low-income, communities of color. But second, it
tapped into a colonial narrative of urban planning that did not include these communities.
In short, Savannah’s downtown was a de facto “white” place; not only as a place where
EJ communities are not located, but as one where EJ communities could not be located.

The redistribution of risk: consolidating spatial order in Savannah
The final EIS received only minor comments following its release. The Savannah
District repeated its claim that the deepening project posed no risks to human health,
refusing to conduct a detailed dispersion modeling assessment of potential emissions or a
risk-based assessment of the health effects associated with the proposed project.
According to the District, Chatham County’s designation as an attainment area was the
reason that a Health Impact Assessment was not conducted. Additionally, the Corps
argued that comparing emission assessments from the Port of Savannah and the Port of
Los Angeles / Port of Long Beach was inappropriate, based on that port’s designation as
“non-attainment.”5

5

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers responses to Andrea Hricko (Appendix A, p.1791-1801) and Citizens for
Environmental Justice (Appendix A, p.1473-1487).
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Despite continuing concerns with the Corps’ Air Emission Inventory and the
District’s cargo and emission projections, EPA approved the project, and in October
2012, Jo Ellen Darcy, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, signed the
Record of Decision, officially completing the project’s NEPA process. But the appeals
by Citizens for Environmental Justice, EPA, and others were able to generate small
victories in the months between the 2010 draft EIS and the Record of Decision. In
response to lingering concerns over environmental injustice, the GPA, with assistance
from the EPA, agreed to establish a community advisory group to meet periodically to
identify and address community concerns or recommendations that may arise associated
with ongoing port activities. In addition, the GPA—in consultation with EPA Region 4
and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division—announced its intent to conduct an
air monitoring study to evaluate any potential impacts on surrounding communities once
the project was complete and GPA was serving Post-Panamax ships in normal operations.
In cooperation with this effort, the Corps included as a project cost funds to provide
technical assistance to the community to help explain scientific data or findings related to
ongoing port activities and studies (USACE 2012e, p.4).
Nonetheless, Citizens for Environmental Justice and EPA maintained that the
Savannah District’s final EIS still failed to accurately represent the risk—primarily air
toxics—associated with port and its Goods Movement Corridor. In particular,
environmental justice advocates claimed that the aggressive upgrades to the port and
surrounding transportation network being made by the GPA and GDOT constituted an
expansion of landside handling capacity, and argued that rather than factor into the
analysis as mechanisms for reducing air-toxics through increased spatio-temporal
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mobility, the upgrades demanded that emissions be recalculated to include additional
cargo movements. Although Citizens for Environmental Justice and the EPA maintained
that the emission estimates were still inadequate, GPA’s commitment to establish a
community advisory group, conduct an air monitoring study in surrounding
neighborhoods, and continue its new emphasis on sustainability and environmental
stewardship, successfully consolidated the redistribution of risk – effectively eliminating
the conditions for the legitimate expression of human health risk and environmental
injustice (Figure 5).
Drawing from different conceptualizations of space—as relational, scalar,
networked, and bounded—the Savannah District was able to rearrange the two primary
elements necessary for “disproportionate impact” – risk and low-income communities of

(Figure 14. The redistribution of risk along the Savannah River. Image: Google Earth.)

135

color. These different ways of conceiving space operated and combined in ways that
ultimately dismantled and delegitimized concerns over human health risk. Over the
history of its assessments the Savannah District did not claim that the port’s adjacent
neighborhoods were not low-income communities of color. In fact, they acknowledge on
several occasions that the neighborhoods surrounding the port have high concentrations
of poverty and communities of color. Neither, though, has the Corps argued that these
communities have not participated in the assessment process. Instead, the Corps has
consistently argued that claims of environmental injustice simply do not make sense.
Drawing on a relational space, the Savannah District was able to argue that
emissions would, at some point, stop growing. Drawing from a scalar construction of
space, they were able to insist that emissions at the port were also coming down – based
on a series of terminal upgrades and diesel reduction initiatives. Drawing from a
networked construction of space, the District claimed that emissions were being reduced
by increased efficiency and an intensified spatio-temporal mobility; transforming the
Garden City Terminal from a site that emissions came from and into a corridor that
emissions moved through. Lastly, drawing on a bounded construction of space allowed
the Corps to spread emissions out through the county and along the entire length of the
navigation channel, tapping into a colonial narrative that put affluent whites closest to the
river and to risk.
Most importantly, it was the combination of these different conceptualizations of
space that worked to dismantle and delegitimize concerns over human health risk. The
Corps drew on multiple conceptualizations of space—at different points in time and with
respect to different elements of the assessment. There were times when the Savannah
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District emphasized one conceptualization of space over others, but it was ability to draw
from multiple conceptions of space—to make them overlap, intersect, and combine in
ways that produce effects—that the District was able to channel what started as a point of
intensified controversy into a consensus.
For example, without positioning the Garden City Terminal within the wider
relational space of port competition, the terminal upgrades and transportation
infrastructure improvements could easily have been read as efforts to improve the port’s
competitive advantage—as efforts to bring additional cargo to Savannah. Indeed, that is
exactly what environmental justice advocates argued. However, it was the ability of the
Corps to “anchor” into that relational space—and to combine it with the diesel reduction
initiatives and new highway projects—that provided them with the ability to justify their
claims that emissions would continue declining. In short, one conceptualization of space
reinforced the others, and made it possible to rearrange containers, emissions, air toxics,
and low-income communities of color in such a way that human health risk was not a
problem.

Discussion: rethinking the spatiality of environmental justice as distribution
So what does all of this mean for rethinking the spatiality of distribution?
Rancière’s work points to distribution not as a measure of proximity or distance, but as a
logic of arrangement. In particular, Rancière’s work suggests that distribution is not
simply a measure of where things are, but a question of where things should be. It is an
important difference; and it offers a way to separate distribution – as an object of analysis
– from distributive justice. Distributional understandings of justice remain grounded in
the notion of unequal distributions of impacts and responsibilities (Schlosberg 2007;
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Walker 2009). The term “unequal,” here, is absolutely critical: it sets up “distribution”
solely as a quantitative measure of amounts. This emphasis on inequality leads, by
necessity to comparative analyses: whether some communities bear a disproportionate
number of, proximity to, or responsibility for environmental risks compared to others.
These comparative analyses, then, reduce the spatial dimensions of “distribution” to
measures of quantity: proximity or distance from environmental hazards; unequal flows
of waste or pollutants from one location to another; unequal exposures to pollutants or
wastes produced in other places; unequal exposure thresholds between different bodies;
unequal levels of political power; or differing levels of socio-spatial vulnerability. The
salient point, then, is that the spatiality of environmental justice—grounded in
distributional understandings of justice and focused on inequalities—becomes, by
necessity, comparative.
Why might this be important? The necessity of comparative analysis limits the
applicability of distributional approaches to case-by-case research. It cannot deliver
powerful explanations of the forces driving environmental injustice because of the
endless possibility of “things” that can be distributed unequally (e.g., political power,
hazards, green space, etc.); thus the pivot by environmental justice scholars toward
questions of procedural justice (i.e., recognition and participation). But this is not, or at
least does not have to be, the only way of conceptualizing the spatiality of distribution.
Rather than pursue distribution as a politics of amounts, Rancière’s work points to
distribution as a mechanism for defining what is, and what can be, made common to the
senses. It is about the construction of a particular world, and how the parts within it
should be allocated. In practice, this means a renewed examination of place-making,
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exploring how conceptualizations of space come to matter in how different
characteristics—safety, sustainability, connectivity, and mobility, among others—become
articulated with places. In Savannah, for example, the controversy over air toxics that
has played out over the history of the District’s assessments has not, necessarily, been
about how to better or more accurately calculate risk. It has been about whether the
characterization of “risky” belongs at all.

Conclusion
Compliance with federal environmental justice policy in Savannah has been the
result of things and people distributed in their proper places. The consensus over air
toxics that was constructed in Savannah points to a necessity of rethinking what the
spatiality of distribution can constitute. Previous conceptualizations rely on a relatively
simplified, uncritical, and implicitly numeric understanding of “distribution.” Perhaps
unwittingly, geographers have approached distribution as a purely quantitative
phenomenon—in terms of proximity and distance. Doing so has resulted in a
conceptualization of distribution as necessarily comparative. While these approaches
were absolutely essential for generating the initial victories of early EJ activism, scholars
have more recently emphasized other spatial dimensions of EJ – recognition and
participation – in an effort to “move beyond” case study oriented approaches that focus
on proximity and distance.
In contrast to these calls, I argue that EJ scholars need to revisit, and more fully
theorize, the spatiality of distribution. Rancière's theorization of politics reveals a
different spatial dimension of distribution, and provides EJ scholars with the conceptual
tools (i.e., the police, the distribution of the sensible, sensible evidences) to examine the
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“very space,” as he puts it, in which environmental injustice is given to sensory
experience and made to make sense. But why is the consolidation of the police – as a
system of organizing and arranging space “properly” – important, and how is it useful for
analysis of environmental justice? In this chapter I have sought to argue that an
expanded spatiality of distribution can help identify underlying causes and processes
responsible for the patterns of racialized exposure that “first generation” EJ scholarship
sought to identify and problematize.
But still, how is such an approach useful? Attending to the system of sensible
evidences that arrange the givens of the risk assessment process point to how compliance
with federal environmental justice policy is constructed and maintained through
particular spatial orderings and arrangements that are made to make sense. In Savannah,
these place-making practices have involved the articulation of different characteristics
(e.g., safety, significance) with certain places. These characteristics, in turn, work to
continually remake the material and discursive realities of Savannah’s urban space, and
encourage a particular way of thinking about them (i.e., the Garden City Terminal as
“sustainable,” the Historic District as “affluent,” and the city’s west-side neighborhoods
as “poor and low-income”). Perhaps more importantly, these sensible evidences – policy
documents, descriptive names, spatial designations, categorizations, definitions,
mappings, and statistics – have enabled new institutional and bodily practices at the Port
of Savannah and in its surrounding neighborhoods that reinforce these characterizations
and sediment the possibilities of the relationship between them.
Using these statements, or sensible evidences, I argue that the origins of
environmental injustice are found in different constitutions of space—as networked,
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relational, or scalar—which operated and combined in ways that ultimately dismantled
and delegitimized concerns over human health risk. In doing so, I argue that these
sensible evidences, these ‘state’s statements,’ work to effectively rearrange—or
redistribute—Savannah’s urban-ecological space in such a way that environmental
injustice is simply unable to make sense. And this is the part that is crucial: the effort has
not been to entirely erase low-income communities of color. Neither has it been to totally
erase human health risk. Instead, the effort has been to separate them—to distribute them
to different places—so that claims of environmental injustice simply don’t make sense.
The Savannah case also has some practical implications as well. Increased
recognition and participation in environmental decision-making have not, necessarily, led
to the realization of environmental justice. Instead, the participation of recognized
environmental justice communities worked, somewhat counterintuitively to further
justify the project’s compliance with federal environmental justice policy. As the EPA,
the Georgia Ports Authority and Department of Transportation, and others continue
terminal and infrastructure improvements, as well as ecological restoration and
preservation efforts, in the areas bordering the Garden City Terminal, the capacity to
reduce emissions (and, by extension, human health risk) has intensified. The result has
been new highway projects like the Jimmy DeLoach Parkway Connector, used by the
Ports Authority and the Department of Transportation to demonstrate: first, their own
successes in reducing risks from air emissions at the port and along freight corridors; and
second, the suitability of the Garden City Terminal and the Georgia Ports for further
sustainability investments and infrastructure development – further securing its position
as the leading port in the Southeast and legitimizing more growth.
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In practice, the environmental impact assessment process has been about a fullscale remaking of the Port of Savannah, especially its Garden City Terminal. These
efforts, however, have not necessarily translated into fewer exposures to less risks or to
greater recognition and participation for environment justice communities, as much as,
say, additional revenues, and the recent emphases on “sustainability” suggests profit
incentives, rather than risk reduction, inform these new practices. As the port becomes
more sustainable (at least on paper) the neighborhoods of Woodville, Hudson Hill and
West Savannah become increasingly burdened by its growth and expansion. Not because
of a regulatory failure to recognize them as low-income or minority, or institutionalized
barriers that limit their participation in decision-making. Instead, these communities
become more exposed to risk because of a much wider distribution of sensible evidences
which stabilize the Garden City Terminal as a site of sustainability. The Garden City
Terminal, then, becomes the logical – indeed, the best and, perhaps even the most just –
site for continued cargo infrastructure expansion because of its increasing articulation
with notions sustainability, mobility, connectivity, efficiency, corporate responsibility,
and others.
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- Chapter 5 Conclusions
My primary concern in this dissertation has been the remaking of a spectacular
Southern landscape.

Perhaps above all else, my aim has been to understand how the

process of building consensus—of dismantling controversy and disagreement—has
worked to reshape the landscape of capitalism, the state, and the lower Savannah River
estuary. I have shown that the consensus that ultimately developed in Savannah took
place after a series of efforts by the Corps and the Ports Authority to rearrange—and
depoliticize—the spaces of non-human nature (e.g., fisheries habitat, dissolved oxygen,
air toxics, wetlands) along the Savannah River in such a way that none of the project’s
key stakeholders—the Ports Authority, the Corps, the wildlife refuge, waterfront industry
and manufacturers, South Carolina, coastal environmental organizations, and “Nature”
among others—experienced a significant loss. And this part has been central: all of the
actors involved in the conflict in Savannah did, at least to some small degree, get what
they wanted: a particular “nature of consensus” so-to-speak. These efforts, however,
have not necessarily translated into less risks from fewer impacts or to greater protections
for environmental and human health, as much as, say, potential revenues from the long
term operation of the project and its subsequent ecological restoration efforts. This
suggests that environmental impact assessment and mitigation planning are deeply
intertwined with a desire to produce the river in such a way that reinforce the city of
Savannah as a site of both modern industrial port operations and sleepy, moss-covered,
bucolic Southern landscapes, in a tension-filled effort to remain articulated into both the
tremendous flows of financial capital from global shipping and historic tourism that
converge on the city.
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Major findings, contributions, and broader implications
At the broadest level, my dissertation has demonstrated that the process of
environmental impact assessment is, at its core, a practice of place-making.
Environmental impact assessment does not merely act on a predefined space of the
“lower Savannah River.” Rather, impact assessment is the very process that creates it –
defining what is in the space; what is not; which things are related, and how; and, which
things are not and why. Ways of constituting and arranging space, then, have different
implications for the composition of problems—or, in this case, environmental impact—
and their possible solutions. If we are to understand how the Savannah Harbor
Expansion Project made the transition from controversy to consensus, we need to outright
reject the notion that the “lower Savannah River” and its constituent parts have any
predefined or static boundaries, relations, arrangements, values, meanings, “proper” or
“natural” places, etc. Rather, we must see the space of “the lower Savannah River” as
almost infinitely malleable; constantly transformed by new associations—supplemental
oxygen injection, diesel engine emission standards, and adaptive management planning,
for instance—and rearranged and reassembled in such a way that environmental impacts
are slowly dismantled, controversy is delegitimized, and consensus and compliance are
built and stabilized.
In Chapter two, I explore how, and with what consequences, oxygen injection
has intersected with and transformed modes of water quality regulation in the Savannah
Harbor. I find that the translation of dissolved oxygen from a biological concentration
measured in milligrams per liter into a geographic object measured in acres of critical
habitat gained or lost, allowed restoration efforts to be concentrated in specific places
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(i.e., those areas identified as “essential fish habitat”) along the river, thereby enabling
point-source pollution loads in general to remain (relatively) unchanged. I demonstrate
how the predictability afforded by more accurate hydrodynamic modeling, combined
with the injection of super-oxygenated river water and the identification of essential fish
habitat, has allowed the states of Georgia and South Carolina—in conjunction with the
EPA—to develop increasingly flexible implementation measures in order to meet future
point-source pollution limits in the face of revised state water quality standards. This
study contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the political ecology of water,
showing how dissolved oxygen—and the ecological functions it performs—is remade
into a form more suited to governance and markets. And while geographic scholarship
has suggested that water has several unique values and entitlements attached to it which
make it particularly resistant to commodification, its biophysical components (dissolved
oxygen, chlorides, or salinity) or its ecological functions (fisheries habitat or the
metabolization of oxygen-demanding wastes) may not present the same challenges. In
particular, the case extends work on the political ecology of water by highlighting the
intricate spatial arrangements necessary to resolve contradictions of capital accumulation
associated with water quality crises and make “hydro-social fixes” (Swyngedouw 2013)
work.
In Chapter three, I interrogate how the institutional resistance and inertia that
undermine adaptive management implementation been overcome in Savannah. I find that
the unintended consequences from past harbor deepening and engineering projects—
particularly the fifteen year operation of a Tidegate across the Back River—lay at the
center of knowledge conflicts in Savannah, with the Corps of Engineers’ proposed
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mitigation strategies embedded in a politics of memory over how previous unintended
impacts and the scientific claims about them are, or should be, remembered. I show how
the activation of the Tidegate, and the unintended impacts from its operation, resulted in a
subtle expansion of the project’s mitigation plan—an extension of the monitoring period,
funding guarantees, and performance criteria—and a significant reconfiguration of the
river’s governance arrangement. In doing so, I show how the landscape of the lower
Savannah River estuary, especially the wildlife refuge and the Tidegate, were activated as
specific “sites of counter-memory” (Legg 2005b) through which scientific knowledge
claims were required to circulate in order to be seen as credible, legitimate, and bearing
any scientific authority. I demonstrate that the presence of the Tidegate’s impacts on the
landscape made concerns over the management of scientific uncertainty inescapable, and
provided the legitimate material and discursive history through which to challenge the
Corps’ narrow approach to adaptive management planning. This work contributes to
geographic scholarship on adaptive management by revealing how it is implemented in
practice, and how institutional resistance is overcome. Despite the numerous challenges
that continue to frustrate efforts to implement adaptive management on a large scale,
memory-work and the politics of remembering/forgetting provide important analytic and
strategic tools for confronting institutional inertia and a techno-scientific culture of riskaversion in order to secure a more open-ended, flexible, and experimental adaptive
management plan. In particular, this work points to the ways in which memory and its
material traces are mobilized as a political resource in disputes over resource
management and environmental governance.
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In Chapter four, I investigate how the Savannah District demonstrated that the
deepening project posed no risk to public health and complied with federal environmental
justice policy. I find that different conceptualizations of space—as relational, networked,
and scalar—overlapped, intersected, and combined in ways that redistributed air
emissions and remade the Garden City Terminal into a site of calculated risk reduction.
Rather than locate environmental injustice in the exposure to more and greater human
health risks or even the misrecognized and marginalized participation for environmental
justice communities (although these are certainly its material manifestations), I show how
the consolidation of a particular way of seeing and thinking about Savannah’s urban
space redistributes risk, and (re)constructs and reifies the city as a space where
environmental injustice is not only not present, but one in which it cannot be present. I
draw from the political thinking of Jacques Rancière (1999, 2001, 2005) to argue for a
fuller understanding of the spatiality of distribution, revealing the ways in which it serves
as a mechanism for defining the boundaries of what becomes sensible, intelligible, and
possible. In doing so, I argue that environmental justice scholars need to revisit, and
more fully theorize, the spatiality of distribution.
Limitations and a few regrets…
Perhaps the most significant limitation to this research is that contains very
limited input from stakeholders, scientists, policy-makers, and community members
actually involved in the fifteen year risk assessment process. This limited input was the
result of several interrelated factors, and the primary motivating force behind my decision
to pursue a historical approach in each of the three papers. First, the meetings of the
Stakeholder Evaluation Group had officially ended several months before my arrival in
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Savannah. While the records kept by the Group did include the names, organizational
affiliation, and contact information of the majority of its participants, court challenges
throughout 2011 and 2012—with several members of the Group either represented as
plaintiffs or called as witnesses—ultimately led many of my requests for interviews with
non-profit organizations, Ports Authority consultants, and regulatory agencies to be
denied. Most often, those interviews that I was granted were done with explicit
recognition that they were to be “off the record.” While many of the people with whom I
spoke were able to direct me to specific documents to help answer my questions, had they
been able to or agreed to comment on them and provide additional or critical insights
would have significantly enriched my reading and analyses of the documents.
A related limitation is presented by the rotating membership of the Stakeholder
Evaluation Group. Many of the members who had participated during the early phases of
the project were no longer involved by the project’s end. The reverse is also true: in the
later years of the project, many of the Group’s most active members were also some of its
more recent. This is particularly important in the case of scientific and technical
consultants who were contracted to work on various components or phases of the project.
While the majority of technical studies and final reports produced by these contractors
are included in the Group’s records, their departure from the project ultimately meant that
any number of potentially critical records containing important insights were no longer
available. This is particularly relevant, for example, in the controversy over water quality
modelling, where the vertical-mixing approach developed by the Ports Authority’s first
contractor—Applied Technology and Management—was rejected by the federal agencies
and resulted in their leaving the project, arguably leaving a biased an incomplete record
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of what happened. A similar case existed early in the project, as the Group membership
negotiated how, and to what extent, records should be kept. The Group’s early meeting
summaries, for example, indicated that meetings had been tape-recorded, used by Larry
Keegan, a project manager from Lockwood-Greene Engineers, to help (re)produce the
meetings summaries and the group’s key decisions. But inconsistency and a lack of
access ultimately led the Group to demand that Georgia Ports provide a court reporter to
record and transcribe meeting proceedings. And while the transcriptions proved to be a
tremendous improvement, missing the first several months of the Group’s negotiations is
an important limitation.
One of the biggest limitations to this research, and perhaps my greatest regret, has
been the necessity of presenting several entangled controversies as discrete, different
problems. The sheer size of the harbor deepening project meant that a number of
interesting conflicts, developments, and influences on its trajectory were left out of the
analysis. While the chapters are presented as a sequence of separate conflicts, the
negotiations that I have discussed never unfolded so cleanly, and should not be read as a
progression from one conflict to the next. Rather, the debates and conflicts I have
discussed—as well as many others—occurred simultaneously and need to be thought
together. For instance, many of the tensions with South Carolina were the result of
tentative plans to build a bi-state port—the Jasper Ocean Terminal—closer to the mouth
of the river on the South Carolina side of the river, and the deepening in Savannah was
seen as a tremendous blow to its success. Similarly, my analysis neglects the ongoing
transformation of several of Savannah’s bedroom communities—Garden City and Pooler
being perhaps the most important examples. The Port of Savannah—as well as its
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surrounding and associated industries—is a tremendous economic driver in these
communities, supporting a substantial portion of these cities’ jobs and their tax base. The
economic development agenda and future land use plans of these places have
undoubtedly played a significant, although unexplored, part in the harbor deepening
project. My analysis also neglects several of the macro-level influences that have driven
(and complicated) the project, particularly the paralysis induced by one of the more
austere political climates in recent history. What I can be sure of, however, is that
whatever challenges the future holds Savannah and its river will most certainly have to
navigate them together.
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